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Preface
Still, intuitive assumptions about behavior is only the starting point of systematic analy-
sis, for alone they do not yield many interesting implications.2
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that are contributions to
the fields of industrial organization, family economics, and energy economics. Each
chapter has its own introduction and can be read independently of the other two
chapters. All three chapters have the common theme “dynamic optimization” of either
an individual’s or firm’s objective. The first two chapters apply the tools of optimal
control theory to study diﬀerent aspects of learning and timing, one in the field of
industrial organization, the other in family economics.
The first model studies the optimal timing for a firm to adopt a new technology.
Infant industries have often rendered positive externalities, which justify subsidies.
Examples can be found in the renewable energy sector; these technologies not only
provide electricity to their owners, but they also reduce the carbon dioxide content in
the atmosphere. Thus, it is in the public’s interest to support this sector, such that it
can reduce its costs to a level where it can compete with conventional, C02 emitting
technologies. A policy that has been implemented by governments throughout the
world to reduce the cost level, is to either subsidize the research of these technologies or
their distribution. Till this day the economic literature lacks a model that can evaluate
these instruments in a suitable way, allowing predictions of their eﬀects on consumer
and producer surplus, and welfare in general. Chapter 1 demonstrates how government
interventions can aﬀect the optimal timing for adoption of a new technology. The
timing increases positive externalities, as for example in the renewable energy field.
It is not only relevant that renewable energy technologies reach a low cost level in
the future, it is also important to know how many products are distributed before
this future date is reached. In addition, the timing of distribution matters. Imagine
2Gary Becker (Nobel laureate in Economics, 1992)
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there are two production plans for distributing solar panels, where both reach the
same cost level at a distant date in the future with the same number of solar panels
installed. Then the production plan, according to which distribution is larger in the
beginning, is preferred to one, where distribution takes place later, because the first
more greatly reduces the amount of carbon dioxide being released in the atmosphere.
Furthermore this first chapter makes predictions on how the eﬀects change, when the
total quantity that can be produced is fixed; the installations of wind powered energy
plants in Germany exemplify this point. Onshore, there have only been a few new
instalments of wind power plants lately, because of a lack of suitable space. Sales and
research subsidies have a very diﬀerent eﬀect in this case, when the total production
quantity is not endogenous. Depending on whether producer rents, consumer rents or
early implementation are more important to the government, the chapter oﬀers the
appropriate tools to attain its objective.
The second model analyzes the optimal timing for a woman to give birth. Malthu-
sianism has become a widely used term, one that stems from the paper ‘Essay on the
Principle of Population’ written by the infamous Thomas Malthus. He is one of the
main founders of population economics; forecasting that population growth would ulti-
mately outstrip the world’s food supply in 1798. With the immigration to the Americas
and Industrialization, the arguments of his essay became quickly neutralized. As Indus-
trialization advanced on the world, fertility began to stagnate and then to the surprise
of many avid Malthusians, recede.
Starting in the richer countries, fertility first began to fall in industrialized countries.
Within the last decades it has finally become possible to see a decline in growth rates in
the developing world, as they slowly have become richer. What is astonishing is not only
the rate at which this is happening but the scale of the decline. Developing countries
are changing so rapidly that the demographic transition has become one of the largest
social changes taking place. An example of this is Iran, in 1984 the fertility rate was
still relatively high at 7 children, in 2006 is had dropped to 1.9. With the worldwide
debate over the threats and solutions to climate change larger than ever before, the
Maltusian worries are resurfacing. Fears of a growing, richer, more consumer driven
population have steered economists to take a closer look at population growth. With
fertility rates falling in India, Brazil and Indonesia, the fertility rate has now reached
the replacement rate of 2.1 in half of the world. The trepidation of the environmental
impact due to high fertility can, at least for now, be negated.
A decrease of fertility along with a longer life expectancy, leads to an increase
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in the proportion of people that are retired compared to those that are working. A
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system is characterized by contributions to their
beneficiaries, financed through the regular payment flows of working individuals, such
that reserves do not need to be created. If a fall in fertility occurs too quickly, then
a PAYG financed pension system could collapse. Retired people generally have ac-
cumulated own savings, but these are often insuﬃcient to cover the entire retirement
phase if the share of the working population is relatively too low. Fewer people being
born means, there is less income during those periods, when they would have been
contributing on the job market. Lower old age pensions mean that the society’s wel-
fare decreases. In most pension systems there is no coherence between fertility and
pensions. Chapter two evaluates government policies that increase the incentive to
have children in order to smooth the digression of fertility.
This chapter is a joint work with Ray Rees, and contains a model to solve for the
optimal timing of childbirth and the optimal number of children in a continuous time
framework simultaneously. The model depicts how changes in wage at diﬀerent stages of
an individual’s life, influence the timing decision of childbirth and the optimal number
of children. Some of the numerous findings are quite surprising. When a woman would
like to have more children, she decides to have them at a younger age. Medical research
that extends the fecund life span induces women to have fewer children. A reduction
of the parental leave due to day-care centers, and a reduction in the costs of leave due
to child benefits, increases the number of children. Women value labor more, when
they face the risk of an unknown divorce. This paper also shows that divorce does not
change the timing of childbirth directly, however it influences the number of children
negatively, and the reduced number of children delays the timing. The model can be
used to predict upper bound fertility rates, when the expected divorce rate continues
to increase.
While the first two models are framed in continuous time, the third is framed in
discrete time. It studies the eﬀect of default risk on a market, where its players meet
twice; on a contract and on a spot market. The financial crisis has shown that there are
market players, which are "too big to fail". In order to preserve the financial system’s
stability, banks and insurances that have incurred speculation losses, have been bailed
out. Together with the nationalization of the firm, its debts are refinanced through
taxpayers’ money. In conjunction with this issue revealed by the banking crisis, the risk
of bankruptcy alone, can aﬀect welfare negatively, which is demonstrated in chapter 3.
The chapter illustrates this point for the electricity sector, using a method that can
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be easily applied to other sectors as well. Upstream producers that possess market
power, sell forwards with a lengthy duration to regional electricity companies (REC).
As part of the liberalization of the electricity market, RECs have been privatized and
exposed to a possible bankruptcy risk, if spot prices fall below their expected value. An
interesting observation is that the downstream firm’s expected profit is larger, when it
is less likely to be bailed out. The intuition behind this result is that producers adopt
the spot price upwards to lower the retailer’s default risk that is positively correlated
to the REC’s loss from its contracts. The eﬀect on upstream profits is ambiguous while
consumers loose. Options are less welfare increasing than forwards, but the diﬀerence is
minimal. In the presence of bankruptcy, options are the preferred welfare maximizing
market instrument.
Chapter 1
Learning and Technology Adoptions
1.1 Introduction
Typical infant industries are characterized by cost reductions through learning in the
production process, and continuous new technology adoptions. Mature industries are
often characterized by numerous technology generations, while learning takes place at
the same time.1 Market players try to find new technologies that are more sustainable,
eﬃcient and safer, however, at the same time they are improving existing technologies.
Thus it is important to connect both: experience and innovations in a single model. In
this dynamic framework a firm can adopt innovation breakthroughs from its research
department. In addition, the firm decides upon a pricing rule for each point in time.
It is assumed that experience spills over to the next technology generation after an
innovation breakthrough has been adopted. The empirical literature till present, has
concentrated on learning models, in which technology spillovers were absent (Irwin and
Klenow, 1994). Jamasb (2007) is an exception: in his purely econometric analysis, he
estimates learning by doing and research rates for a range of energy technologies in
diﬀerent stages of technical progress. He separates the cost reduction eﬀect caused by
learning and research, expressed by cumulative sales and patents. Unfortunately, it is
diﬃcult to obtain data on costs, which makes the study rely on very few data points.
This model shall be the theoretical foundation of applied work, in which firms can
use the experience, they have accumulated thus far, for the next technology generation.
In macroeconomics, there are studies, where the experience gained from learning, is
passed on from one generation to the next. Examples are Young (1993) and Parente
1Currently produced nuclear power plants for example use the 3rd technology generation, the 4th
generation will be deployed some time around 2030.
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(1994). Young makes clear that innovations occur in markets that are large. In this
setup, production costs do not decrease with new technology adoptions, but rather
through learning. In Parente’s model, learning and technology adoptions occur both
after the product introduction. A firm faces a trade-oﬀ between learning at a decreasing
rate or switching to a new technology, which is costly as not all expertise can be
transferred. In return, the learning curve becomes steeper. From a microeconomic
perspective, both models face one problem in particular: learning occurs only through
time and not through cumulative production or "by doing". Therefore the strategic
pricing behavior of firms can not be analyzed. This paper introduces a model, where
firms simultaneously choose a research budget and the optimal production quantity,
exploiting the learning eﬀect optimally. The production and the time of technology
adoptions are control variables of the firm.
This research has two main objectives: firstly, to describe the market equilibrium of
a setup that accounts for innovations and learning; and secondly, to show the eﬀects of
subsidies on the market equilibrium. The second objective is based on the observation
that products produced by learning industries have often rendered positive externalities
in the past; renewable energy technologies can be cited as examples. The production
cost per unit of electricity has been reduced significantly for technologies that are
powered by wind, sunlight and biomass. The positive externality is the deduction of
the carbon dioxide level in the atmosphere, because electricity from renewable energy is
a perfect substitute to conventionally generated electricity.2 It is illustrated that sales
and innovation subsidies have the same eﬀect on the innovation date and prices, if and
only if the innovation date and total cumulative production quantity are endogenous.
Eﬀects diﬀer significantly, when the total quantity that can be produced in a market
is fixed. An example for such products, whose costs are aﬀected by learning are wind
power plants. In Germany the installation of onshore wind power plants reached its
peak in 2002, with an installed capacity of over 3000 MW. The installed capacity in
2009 was estimated to be less than 1000 MW due to a lack of suitable space (Dena,
2005). The cost of producing wind power capacity has fallen drastically; the price of 1
KW wind energy capacity fell by 29% between 1990 and 2004 (Iset, 2005).
The layout of this model is as follows: a social planner or monopolist learn with
some learning parameter λ, and it can choose any particular date in the future, when
they would like to adopt a new technology. This is characterized by an increase of
2Another example is the aerospace technology, which was mainly developed for military purposes
during the 1930s and 40s. This was a stepping stone for the development of commercially used
airplanes, which has enabled societies to travel and trade at an increased pace. The learning eﬀect in
this industry was described by Wright (1936).
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the learning parameter to γ, where γ ≥ λ. After the innovation date, newly gained
experience reduces the present level of cost by more, than before the innovation date.
Thus the process innovation described here, is a substitute to learning. A firm can
adopt a new technology when its research department has been successful. The cost
of research is given by a convex and decreasing function a(t1), where t1 is the date
of innovation. When firms prefer an earlier innovation date over that of a late one,
then they employ more researchers; this is reflected by a higher innovation cost in the
model. The setting is deterministic to avoid unnecessary complications, which would
not add any further results. Players choose the date of innovation at the beginning of
the planning horizon; production starts thereafter. In the first step, a pricing rule is
derived for an exogenous innovation date, which is endogenized thereafter.
The findings of this paper are: the social planner/ monopolist charges two diﬀer-
ent prices, for the time phases before the innovation and after the innovation. Both
prices are constant for a constant price elasticity of demand. After the innovation
has occurred, the decision maker’s price rule, is such that the price (social planner)
or the marginal revenue (monopolist) equal marginal cost at the last unit produced.
This result is analogous to the findings of Spence (1981) who examined learning in
the absence of innovations. However before the innovation occurs, the social planner’s
(monopolist’s) price rule is such that the price (marginal cost) equals marginal cost at
t1 plus a negative constant. At the time of innovation, the costate variables of the two
phases equal the ratio of the learning parameters λ/γ. Thus there is a downward jump
in prices at the innovation date. In a second step, a subsidy on innovation cost and
a subsidy on sales are introduced. The central results of these market interventions
are: innovation subsidies and distribution subsidies reduce the prices of both phases if
all variables (the timing of innovation t1, the cumulative production quantities at the
innovation date; y(t1) and at the end of the planning horizon y(T )) are endogenous.
Both subsidy types induce innovation to proceed earlier. Consequently the total quan-
tity produced during the entire planning horizon increases. The production plan in the
presence of subsidies lies entirely above the production plan without subsidies. The
result being, if early distribution yield positive externalities, then subsidies on sales
and on innovation contain an additional positive eﬀect.3
It is also shown that a subsidy on innovation cost (sales), which is financed through
a tax on sales (innovation cost) changes the proportion of consumer and producer
rents. Customers generally benefit more from sales subsidies, producers from innovation
3For technologies in the renewable energy sector holds that early distributions increase their pos-
itive externality on the atmosphere more. The total carbon dioxide emissions are reduced more,
because renewable energy sources can substitute conventional C02 emitting ones earlier.
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subsidies. Another central result emerges, when the total production y(T ) is restricted.
In this case the two kinds of subsidies that are analyzed have diﬀerent eﬀects.
The next section introduces the model and solves for an optimal pricing rule, which
is analyzed in detail. Section 1.3 endogenizes the timing of innovation. Section 1.4
continues with a welfare analysis. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model with an exogenous innovation date
This model is solved for diﬀerent market structures, at first the social planner’s problem
is solved, which can be easily extended to account for a market with perfect competition
that yields quite similar results. The learning by doing case without innovation has
been examined similarly by Brueckner et al. (1983). Later a monopolist takes the
place of the social planner. This scenario is more relevant to reality, because in an
environment of innovations, patents guarantee that their holders are able to execute
market power. It has been rarely observed that a state runs a public firm in a learning
industry, nevertheless a social planner’s actions are examined as though they are almost
identical to those of a monopolist.
1.2.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
Assume there is a publicly owned firm, which faces the demand function: x(p(t), t) for
a non-storable output x(t) that is sold at a price p(t). Time is denoted by t ∈ R0+. The
beginning of the first phase, when the planning horizon begins is t0. The time when
the innovation takes place is t1. It is the end of the first phase and the beginning of
the second phase. The planning horizon ends at t = T . The firm chooses an optimal
time path for its control variables during the first phase, p0(t) and the second phase,
p1(t); where p(t) = {p0(t), p1(t)} The instantaneous production flows of the first and
second phase are x0(p0(t), t) and x1(p1(t), t) respectively. They are the derivatives of
the state variables y0(t) and y1(t), which are the cumulative production quantities for
a period t before and after the innovation. Over the intervals [t0, t1] and [t1, T ], the
social planner receives a stream of consumption benefits discounted back to t = t0,
Z t1
t0
B0(p0(t), t)e−r(t−t0)dt and
Z T
t1
B1(p1(t), t)e−r(t−t0)dt (1.1)
where B0(p0(t), t) and B1(p1(t), t) denote the per-period social surplus during the
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first and second phase. They are each equivalent to the area below the inverse demand
function at some t, before and after t1, respectively. The social planner faces a marginal
cost that consists of two parts; a fixed part denoted by the parameterm, and a variable
part that is equal to c at the beginning of the first phase, when experience y0(t) equals
zero. This variable part decreases with a learning parameter λ before an innovation
occurs. Intuitively there is continuous discounting involved, which is expressed by the
exponential term.
MC0(y0(t)) = m+ ce−λy0(t) for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 (1.2)
The social planner can adopt a new technology, when the research department has
been successful. The faster an innovation occurs, the more costly it is. For now, the
innovation cost function depends solely on the innovation date t1. When no innovation
occurs and the firm produces with the same technology during the entire planning
horizon, then the innovation cost is zero; a(t1) > 0,∇t \ t = T where a(T ) = 0. a0 < 0,
a00 > 0. A new technology is adopted right after the innovation. Otherwise, if a later
date of innovation is preferred, the planner could reduce its cost by devoting fewer
resources to its research department. A diﬀerent cost function is introduced in section
1.2.4. The innovation cost is assumed to be paid in advance at t0. After t1 the firm
faces more intensive learning; it learns with a learning parameter γ ≥ λ. Experience
completely transfers to the new technology . Switching costs are ignored, because they
do not yield results, which extend the knowledge of the existing literature (see Parente,
1993). The second phase’s marginal costs are
MC1(y1(t)) = m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)] for t1 < t ≤ T (1.3)
Thus the social planner’s objective is,
Max
p0(t), p1(t), t1
SP ≡
Z t1
t0
e−r(t−t0)
©
B0(p0(t), t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t))x0[p0(t), t]
ª
dt (1.4)
−a(t1)e−rt0 +
Z T
t1
e−r(t−t0)
©
B1(p1(t), t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)])x1[p1(t), t]
ª
dt,
where ∂Bi∂pi = pi(t)
∂xi[pi(t),t]
∂pi(t)
for i ∈ (0, 1). The constraints of the problem are given by
·
y0(t) = x0[p0(t), t] t ∈ [t0, t1] (1.5)
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·
y1(t) = x1[p1(t), t] t ∈ [t1, T ] (1.6)
y0(t0) = 0 (1.7)
y0(t1) = y1(t1) = y(t1) is free (1.8)
y1(T ) is free (1.9)
·
y0(t) and
·
y1(t) are time derivatives of cumulative production quantities or experi-
ence stocks. To keep this analysis simple, a real interest rate of zero is assumed. In the
appendix it is shown, how the equilibrium changes when r 6= 0. Flows are functions of
the price and time, where the price itself is a function of time. The cumulative quan-
tity cannot change over night, when the innovation takes place and the new production
process is adopted (1.8). Condition (1.9) is used as a transversality condition for the
second phase. Necessary conditions of this problem are derived in two steps. Firstly
this study examines some innovation date t1 ∈ [t0, T ] and solves for the price paths
p0(t) and p1(t) with t1 being fixed. In the next step the innovation date is endogenized.
Proposition 1.1 A social planner chooses a constant price for each period of phase
one and two respectively. The two prices are diﬀerent across phase one [t0, t1] and
phase two [t1, T ].
Proof By a theorem of Hestens, take SP (1.4) with a fix t1 and define η0(t)
on the interval [t0, t1] and η1(t) on the interval [t1, T ] as the costate variables of the
cumulative quantities y0(t) and y1(t) respectively.4 The innovation cost function is
a(t1). It can be ignored during the time the pricing rule is analyzed, because t1 is
fixed. Thus a(t1) is constant and drops out of the first order condition that describes
the optimal pricing rule. The Hamiltonian is
H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] = B0(t)− C0(t) +B1(p1(t), t)− C1(t) (1.10)
−a(t1) + η0(t)x[p0(t), t] + η1(t)x[p1(t), t]
where Ci(t) = xi(t)MCi(yi(t)) for i ∈ (0, 1) is the per-period cost. p∗0(t) and p∗1(t)
maximize (1.10) such that
4see Takayama p.658
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H [p∗0(t), p
∗
1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] ≥ H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] (1.11)
for all p0(t) ≥ 0, p1(t) ≥ 0.
The pricing rule for the first phase (t ≤ t1)
As p∗0(t) maximizes H for (t ≤ t1), the necessary condition is
∂H
∂p0(t)
= p0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
− ∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
(m+ ce−λy0(t)) + η0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
.
= 0
⇔ p0(t) = m+ ce−λy0(t) − η0(t) (1.12)
The social planner sets a price that equals the marginal cost minus the shadow price
of cumulative quantity at some t. The second necessary condition is
·
η0(t) = −
∂H
∂y0(t)
⇔ η0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + const1 (1.13)
The third necessary condition is (1.5).
Lemma 1.1 The shadow price at the end point of the first phase equals η0(t1) =
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ).
Proof. See appendix.
The second necessary condition (1.13) can be solved for const1 with the transversality
condition η0(t1) = −λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) . Evaluating η0(t) at t1
const1 = −
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ− γ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
=⇒ η0(t) = ce−λy0(t) −
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ− γ
γ
ce−λy(t1) (1.14)
(1.13) and (1.14) solve for the price of the first phase
p0 = m+
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ); t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 (1.15)
During the first phase, p0 is independent of time, which completes the first part of the
proof of 1.1
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The pricing rule for the second phase (t > t1)
The necessary first order condition with respect to p1(t) can be solved for a function
of the the second phase’s costate
∂H
∂p1(t)
= p1(t)
∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
−∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
(m+ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)])+η1(t)
∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
.
= 0
⇔ p1(t) = m+ ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)] − η1(t) (1.16)
The social planner’s price is equal to the marginal cost minus the shadow price of
cumulative quantity. The second condition that needs to be fulfilled is
·
η1(t) = −
∂H
∂y1(t)
⇔ η1(t) = ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)] + const2 (1.17)
The third condition is given by (1.6). η(T ) = 0, because the value of experience at
the end of the second phase is zero. The cumulative quantity at the end of the second
phase is not restricted, hence (1.9) can be used to set up the following transversality
condition, which solves for const2.
const2 = −ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
=⇒ η1(t) = ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)] − ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) (1.18)
(1.17) and (1.18) are used to express the second phase’s price
p1 = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ); t1 ≤ t ≤ T (1.19)
For any t where t1 ≤ t ≤ T , the price of phase 2 is constant. This completes the
second part of proposition 1.1’s proof.
It is assumed that the demand function does not change over time, thus the planner
produces the same quantity in each period within the first phase and the same quantity
within the second phase. The intuition behind this result is: although costs decrease
through time, which would yield lower prices in a static model, the decrease of costs is
completely oﬀset by the decrease of the experience value in this dynamic framework.
When either γ = λ or t1 = T , then (1.15) and (1.19) are equal: p0(t) = p1(t) =
m+ ce−λy(T ). For γ > λ or t1 < T , the price of the first phase exceeds the price of the
second, which is as follows
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p0 > p1
⇔ λ
γ
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ− γ
γ
e−λy(t1) > e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
⇔ λ− γ
γ
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) >
λ− γ
γ
e−λy(t1)
γ[y(t1)− y(T )] < 0
As the last expression holds, it follows that the claim p0 > p1 is correct. A social
planner encounters a loss, because during the first phase, the price is below the marginal
cost at t1, during the second phase the price just covers its cost at t = T and is below
that level for all preceding periods. Therefore one would need to introduce a tax on a
diﬀerent market to compensate for the loss. The monopolist’s problem is solved, before
the results, which are quite similar are interpreted further.
1.2.2 The Monopolist’s Problem
The monopolist’s instantaneous profit functions for the two phases are,
π0(t) ≡
£
p0(t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t))
¤
x0(p0(t), t) : t ∈ [t0, t1] (1.20)
π1(t) ≡
£
p1(t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)])
¤
x1(p1(t), t) : t ∈ [t1, T ] (1.21)
where the variables and parameters are defined and interpreted in the social planner’s
problem. The firm’s objective is,
Max MP =
Z t1
t0
π0(t)e−r(t−t0)dt− a(t1)e−rt0 +
Z T
t1
π1(t)e−r(t−t0)dt (1.22)
subject to constraints (1.5) to (1.9). In the absence of discounting, the Hamiltonian
equals
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H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] = π
0(t) + π1(t)− a(t1) + η0(t)x[p0(t), t] + η1(t)x[p1(t), t]
(1.23)
One can use the same methods that were used to derive (1.15) and (1.19) to derive
the pricing rules when a monopolist is the decision maker
p0
µ
1− 1
ε(t)
¶
= m+ ce−λy(t1) − η0(t)
where ε(t) = −∂x0
∂p0
p0
x0
⇒MR0(t) = m+ ce−λy(t1) −
∙
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¸
; t0 ≤ t ≤ t1
(1.24)
(1.24) is the pricing rule before the innovation date,
p1
µ
1− 1
ε(t)
¶
= m+ ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)] − η1(t)
where ε(t) = −∂x1
∂p1
p1
x1
⇒MR1(t) = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) (1.25)
and (1.25) the innovation date after t1. Therefore the monopolist sets the price
where the marginal revenue equals marginal cost minus the shadow price of cumulative
quantity. The only diﬀerence to the social planner’s problem is that the optimal rule
contains the multiplier (1 − 1ε(t)), and thus the marginal revenue and not the price,
appears in the optimality condition. Prices in the monopoly model are constant for
constant elasticities ε(t) = ε, hence the same holds for the per period production
quantities. When either the equality γ = λ or t1 = T hold, then (1.24) reduces to
(1.25): MR0(t) =MR1(t) =m+ce−λy(T ). This is the classical optimal pricing behavior
of a learning monopolist in the absence of innovations shown by Spence (1981): "At
every time, output should be profit maximizing output, given that marginal cost is the
unit cost that obtains at the end of the period".5 The total cost that a firm faces is
5See page 52.
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the area underneath the learning curve or marginal cost curve between t0 and T . If
the firm increases output by 0, in any interval within [t0, t1] or by 1, in any interval
within [t1, T ], then the incremental cost is not the cost that arises during that time. It
is rather the change of the total area below the learning curve.
Proposition 1.2 In the presence of innovations, a monopolist charges a price such
that marginal revenue equals incremental cost at any point in time.
Proof. See appendix.
Consequently, within the interval [t1, T ] the monopolist prices optimally, when the
marginal revenue at each point in time equals the marginal cost of the last unit pro-
duced. MR1(t) = MC|t=T by (1.25). In the interval [t0, t1] the monopolist charges
MR0(t) = MC|t=t1 −λγ
£
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
by (1.24), where the sum in
brackets is positive. Consequently, the monopolist charges a lower price such that
marginal revenue at each point in time is below the marginal cost of the last unit
produced at t1, because production continues beyond t1. The "price discount" equals
λ
γ
£
ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − ce−λy(t1)
¤
.6 It contains information about how much the ex-
perience level y(t1) is worth for the production after t1. In the next section this term
is analyzed further.
If discounting is included in the analysis, then prices increase compared to those in
(1.24) and (1.25) for all t. When future profits are discounted, then learning is valued
less, because the experience payoﬀ decreases. Thus in the presence of a positive discount
rate, the firm increase its price over the entire planning horizon. In a model without
discounting, learning is appreciated most in the beginning of the planning horizon,
because its return lasts for a long period of time. In the absence of innovations the
price diﬀerence between a model with and without a discount rate, reaches its peak
at t0. In this model, where innovation increases the learning parameter, the price
diﬀerence could even be larger at t1 than at t0, because the learning intensity jumps.
At T , prices that include discounting are equal to those where discounting is absent,
because the return to experience is non-existing.
Proposition 1.3 When r 6= 0, then a monopolist sets its price during the first phase,
such that the following condition holds,MR0(t) = m+λγ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )+ γ−λγ ce
−λy(t1)+
6To be precise, the price discount also contains the constant multiplier
¡
1− 1ε
¢−1
, which is ignored
in the following partial analysis.
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r
Z t1
t
£
m+ ce−λy0(τ)
¤
e−r(τ−t)dτ + r
R T
t1
[m + ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−r(τ−t)dτ . During
the second phase the optimality condition is MR1(t) = m + ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T ) +
r
Z T
t
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(τ)
i
e−r(τ−t)dτ
Proof. See appendix.
The additional terms on the right hand side are positive, which implies that the price
increases. At r = 0, the conditions reduce to (1.24) and (1.25).
The market equilibrium of a social planner and a monopolist are quite similar.
In the past, infant industries have been heavily subsidized by governments, but they
were not run as public firms. Examples are the aerospace and defense industry during
and after World War Two, computer industries in the 1980/90s and firms that have
operated in the renewable energy sector during the last 10 years. In the presence of
learning and innovations, where the later can be protected by property rights, there
are either monopolies or oligopolies in the market. This holds true for all industries
mentioned above: Airbus and Boeing (aerospace market), Microsoft and IBM (software
and hardware) and the renewable energy sector, where for instance five producers have
a market share of over 90% of worldwide wind turbine sales.7 Based on these real
world observations, for the rest of this article, it seems reasonable to assume that a
monopolist is the decision maker. Furthermore it does not matter much, because the
pricing rules diﬀer by a multiplier that depends on the demand elasticity.
1.2.3 A partial comparative analysis
The price discount of the first phase
The first phase’s price discount is λγ
£
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
. This section stud-
ies the discount’s size based on the underlying parameters. It follows a comparative
analysis; the discount is partially diﬀerentiated with respect to the parameters λ, γ
and c. It is important to note that all parameters aﬀect the three variables t1, y(t1)
and y(T ), which are fixed here. This analysis is meant to explain intuitively the results
that are derived later, when t1 and y(t1) are endogenous, but y(T ) is not.
∂(·)
∂λ
[ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]
µ
1
γ
− λ
γ
y(t1)
¶
(1.26)
7Press release of BTM Consult ApS (27.3.2008).
Learning and Technology Adoptions 17
The first bracket of (1.26) is positive, the second is positive for λy(t1) < 1, which is
satisfied in the numerical simulation later. The price discount of the first phase rises
with the learning parameter of the first phase, λ. The monopolist reduces its first
phase’s price to exploit a larger learning intensity.
∂(·)
∂γ
= − λ
γ2
£
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
+
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] [y(T )− y(t1)]
(1.27)
In (1.27), the first summand is negative, because its bracket term is positive. The
second summand is positive. The first summand exceeds the second in absolute value
conditional on eγ[y(T )−y(t1)] − 1 > γ[y(T ) − y(t1)]. This condition is met when the
produced quantity after t1 is large enough. A large learning parameter after the in-
novation, γ decreases the incentive to reduce the incentive to reduce cost before the
innovation date.
∂(·)
∂c
=
λ
γ
£
e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
(1.28)
(1.28) shows, how the variable part of the marginal cost level aﬀects the price discount
of the first phase.8 The derivative is positive, because the return to experience increases
when the original cost level is high. The price discount on p0 increases with λ and c,
it decreases with γ.
The Costates
The costate variables are positive for all t, however they decrease. η0(t) declines at a
rate of the marginal cost’s derivative for the first phase, η1(t) at a rate of the marginal
cost’s derivative for the second phase. An interesting result is that the quotient of the
two costates at the optimal innovation time t1 is the quotient of the learning parameters:
η0(t1) =
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) =
λ
γ
η1(t1)⇒
η0(t1)
η1(t1)
=
λ
γ
(1.29)
Figure 1.1 shows the course of two costates, given a cumulative production quantity at
the innovation date of 50 and 100. The cumulative quantity at the end of the planning
horizon is 150, thus experience becomes worthless and both costate functions converge
8Recall that MC|t=0 = m+ c
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Figure 1.1: Costates jump at the date of innovation
to the horizontal axis. At y(t1) the costates jump vertically upward such that the
costate at lim
→0
[y(t1) + ] is γλ times larger compared to its value at lim→0 [y(t1)− ].
Prices have been derived as functions of costates during phase one, (1 − 1ε)−1p0(t) =
m+ce−λy(t)−η0(t) [see (1.24)] and phase two, (1− 1ε)−1p1(t) = m+ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)]−
η1(t) [see (1.25)]. At t1, the prices p0(t) and p1(t) reduce to
¡
m+ ce−λy(t1)
¢
(1 − 1ε),
subtracted by ηi(t)(1 − 1ε) for i ∈ (0, 1). Figure 1 clearly shows an upward jump of
costates, which means that prices drop discontinuously by the amount that the costates
jump with their constant multiplier.
In the past there have been government interventions that aimed to sell a fix number
of products, which are characterized through positive externalities e.g. solar panels.9
Figure 1.1 shows a decrease of y(t1) from 100 to 50, keeping y(T ) and all parameters
constant. The costate of the function, where the innovation occurs earlier is lower
9The "100,000 roof-program" was part of the Renewable Energy Law in Germany. It intended to
install 100,000 solar panels (which would be equivalent to y(T )) in a given time (T ).
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during its first phase compared to the other costate. It exceeds the other costate
thereafter before y(t1) = 75 is reached. Afterwards it is lower again. Therefore the
price during the first phase decreases with y(t1). The next proposition shows that the
same holds true for t1.
Proposition 1.4 An earlier innovation date t1 increases the price p0 and decreases
the price p1, iﬀ y(T ) is fixed.
Proof. The elasticity of demand is assumed to be constant and the monopolist
chooses the optimal innovation date t1 before production starts. Given p0 (1.24) and
p1 (1.25), prices are diﬀerentiated with respect to t1.
∂p0
∂t1
=
(γ − λ)λ
γ| {z }
>0
c
£
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − e−λy(t1)
¤| {z }
<0
ε
ε− 1| {z }
>0
y(t1)
∂t1| {z }
>0
< 0 (1.30)
In (1.30) all terms except of one, are positive for γ > λ, c > 0, y(t1) < y(T ). Later
it is shown numerically that a delay of the innovation date increases the cumulative
quantity up to the innovation date: y(t1)∂t1 > 0.
∂p1
∂t1
=
∂p1
∂y(t1)
y(t1)
∂t1
= c
£
(γ − λ)e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¤| {z }
>0
ε
ε− 1| {z }
>0
y(t1)
∂t1| {z }
>0
> 0 (1.31)
The price after t1 increases, when the innovation occurs earlier.
This result seems to be puzzling at first glance. In the presence of learning without
process innovations, the learning eﬀect is smaller than the level eﬀect of costs. Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1983) show that "output increases over time, ... [but] produce a lot
now to lower costs, then ease oﬀ as an optimal control strategy" [was ruled out by their
results].10 This model also contains the same eﬀects as in the Fundenberg and Tirole
model: A firm chooses a production plan that maximizes today’s profits taking account
of all future cost reductions, where the later is determined by the learning eﬀect. In
the presence of innovations, the learning eﬀect is stronger, when the date of innova-
tion occurs later. Therefore a firm reduces p0 when t1 increases. At the same time it
increases p1, because future time (T − t1) decreases along with the benefit of future
cost reduction. The "today’s-profit maximizing-eﬀect" is stronger than the learning
eﬀect and a decrease of t1 comes with an increase of p0. The intuitions provided by
this partial analysis are helpful for section 1.3, where t∗1 is endogenous. The numerical
10See proposition 2 on p. 525.
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part of section 1.3 contains two parts; in the first part all variables are endogenous,
and it is shown that (1.30) and (1.31) do not hold. In the second part, where t∗1 and
y(t∗1) are endogenous, but y(T ) is not, the results provided here, appear again.
1.2.4 A diﬀerent innovation cost function
In this section the thus far neglected innovation cost function with a diﬀerent structure
is introduced. It was able to be neglected, because it depended solely on the innovation
date, which was exogenous. What happens, when one assumes that the innovation cost
function also depends on the experience accumulated before t1 and a = a[y(t1), t1],
with ∂a∂y(t1) < 0? This assumption is reasonable, when the research department works
closely together with the production floor. The altered transversality condition of the
first phase is η0(t1) = −λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − ∂a[y(t1),t1]∂y(t1) . As innovation cost
decreases with y(t1), so does the marginal revenue
MR0(t) = m+
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
∂a[y(t1), t1]
∂y(t1)
; t0 ≤ t ≤ t1
(1.32)
Accordingly the price during the first phase decreases. The intuition behind the changes
are obvious; experience does not only reduce future production cost, but also the cost
of research.
1.3 The model with an endogenous innovation date
1.3.1 Analytical part
The optimal timing of innovation has been exogenous thus far, in this section it will
be endogenized. The problem is solved for an innovation cost function of the form
a = a(t1). With t1 fixed, consider the following problem with the two segments,
S.0.max
p0(t)
Z t1
t0
{x0(p0, t)(p0 −m− ce−λy0(t))}dt (1.33)
s.t.
·
y0(t) = x0(p0, t), t ∈ [t0, t1] t0, t1 fixed
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and
S.I.max
p1(t)
Z T
t1
{x1(p1, t)(p1 −m− ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(t))}dt (1.34)
s.t.
·
y1(t) = x1[p1, t], t ∈ [t1, T ] t1, T fixed
When p∗0 and p∗1 are solutions to the problem MP (1.22), given conditions (1.5) to
(1.9), then with the Hamiltonians being defined as usual,
H0(p∗0, η0(t)) ≥ H0(p0, η0(t)) ∇p0(t) ≥ 0 (1.35)
H1(p∗1, η1(t)) ≥ H1(p1, η1(t)) ∇p1(t) ≥ 0 (1.36)
where
H0(p0, η0(t)) = π
0(t) + η0(t)x(p0, t)
H1(p1, η1(t)) = π
1(t) + η1(t)x(p1, t)
Adding (1.35) and (1.36), one can see that p∗0 and p∗1 also satisfy Hamiltonian condition
(1.11). Therefore the control variables that solve (1.22) also solve problems (1.35) and
(1.36) respectively. Denote the maximized values of the objectives S.0. (1.33) by V ∗0 (t)
and S.I. (1.34) by V ∗1 (t). A standard result of optimal control theory is
∂V ∗0 (t)
∂t1
= H0(t1) and
∂V ∗1 (t)
∂t∗1
= −H1(t∗1) (1.37)
Consider the optimal value of t∗1, denoted by t∗1 ∈ (t0, T ). If t∗1 is optimal, it must solve
max
t1
½Z t1
t0
π0(p0, t)dt+
Z T
t1
π1(p1, t)dt− a(t1)
¾
= V ∗0 (t) + V
∗
1 (t)− a(t1) (1.38)
∂
∂t1
[V ∗0 (t) + V
∗
1 (t)− a(t1)] = H0(t∗1)−H1(t∗1)−
∂a(t∗1)
∂t∗1
.
= 0
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Figure 1.2: Benefits and costs of delaying innovation
⇔ a0(t∗1) = π0(t∗1) + η0(t∗1)x[p0, t∗1]− π1(t∗1)− η1(t∗1)x[p1, t∗1] (1.39)
(1.39) reveals that the optimal innovation date t∗1, the diﬀerence of the first and
second phase’s returns equal the derivative of the innovation function with respect to t∗1,
where the word ’return’ circumscribes the instantaneous profit flow π(t∗1) and the return
to experience η(t∗1)x[p, t∗1]. A simple innovation cost function a (·) that shall mimic
reality has the following characteristics: a(t1) > 0 ∇t \ t = T where a(T ) = 0, a0 < 0,
a00 > 0. Thus innovation is costly if it is implemented within the planning horizon.
The cost is proportionally larger, the sooner innovation takes place. The right side of
(1.39) is moderately negative over the entire planning horizon, which can be shown
numerically. Therefore the equality of both sides is guaranteed for an appropriate set
of parameters. Figure 1.2 demonstrates that postponing innovation comes along with
lower innovation cost (left diagram), but an increase of the production cost (on the
right). The optimality condition for t∗1 (1.39) conveys the same result; in the optimum
the cost savings of delaying innovation per period (left side) equals the diﬀerences of
return of phase 1 and 2 (right side).
In section 1.2.4, the innovation cost function was changed to a[y(t1), t1]. If one
accounts for these changes here, (1.39) adjusts to
∂a[y(t∗1), t∗1]
∂t∗1
+
∂a[y(t∗1), t∗1]
∂y(t∗1)
∂y(t∗1)
∂t∗1
= π0(t∗1)+η0(t
∗
1)x(p0)−π1(t∗1)−η1(t∗1)x(p1, t∗1) (1.40)
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If ∂a[y(t1),t1]∂t1 has not changed and the assumptions
∂a[y(t1),t1]
∂y(t1)
< 0 and ∂y(t1)∂t1 > 0 hold,
then the left side of (1.40) decreases. The optimal date of innovation would increase and
the monopolist’s research budget would decrease. When an increase in y(t1) decreases
the innovation cost, then the value of waiting with an innovation adoption increases.
1.3.2 Numerical part
After introducing a specific demand function, a numerical simulation method is used
to find specific values of t∗1, y(t∗1) and y(T ). Tax and subsidy parameters are added
simultaneously. They are also helpful for the next section, when a welfare analysis is
carried out.
Demand: The per period inverse demand function is,
p(xi) =
xi−α
1− α (1.41)
for i ∈ (0, 1). For p(xi) as defined in (1.41), the price elasticity of demand is ε = −∂x∂p
p
x =
1
α .
11 It follows from (1.24) and (1.25) that MRi = ki ⇔ pi(1 − α) = ki ⇔ x−αi = ki,
where
k0 =
µ
m+
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ) +
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t
∗
1)
¶
k1 =
¡
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T )
¢
Sales subsidy/ tax: An ad valorem subsidy (τ > 1) or tax parameter (τ < 1) is added,
a subsidy shifts the demand function out, a tax shifts it in. A demand function of the
the type in (1.41), which includes the parameter τ is
xi =
µ
τ
pi(1− α)
¶β
(1.42)
It is helpful to transform (1.39) such that the t2-optimality condition becomes
x0 [p0 −MC(t∗1) + η0(t∗1)]− x1 [p1 −MC(t∗1) + η1(t∗1)] = a0(t∗1) (1.43)
(1.29), (1.42) and (1.2) or (1.3) are substituted in (1.43)
11Define β = 1α . One can easily account for a time-varying demand function by multiplying p(xi)
with b(t) where b(t)β = beδt. But this does not add much to this analysis.
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ατβ
1− α
³
k1−β0 − k1−β1
´
= a0(t∗1) (1.44)
Innovation cost: An innovation cost function that fulfills the requirements; a(t∗1) >
0,∇t \ t = T where a(T ) = 0. a0 < 0, a00 > 0 is
a(t∗1) = ie
−μt∗1 − ie−μT (1.45)
The parameter i aﬀects the level of the innovation cost, the parameter μ the slope with
respect to t∗1.
Innovation subsidy/ tax: The innovation subsidy is constructed in a way such that the
government either pays a part of the innovation cost, s > 0 or charges a tax, s < 0.
Thus the gross innovation cost is
a(t∗1) = ρ[ie
−μt∗1 − ie−μT ] (1.46)
where ρ = 1− s. a0(t∗1) decreases with ρ, hence it becomes less beneficial for the firm
to procrastinate the innovation timing and the innovation date occurs earlier when
innovation is subsidized. Equation (1.44) can be rewritten as
ατβ
1− α
³
k1−β0 − k1−β1
´
= −ρμie−μt∗1 (1.47)
(1.47) is the optimality conditions for t1. In addition, one needs to express y(t∗1)
and y(T ) to solve for these three variables simultaneously. The demand function (1.42)
and the optimality condition pi = (1−α)−1ki solve for the per period demand of phase
1, x0 =
³
τ
k0
´β
. As the per period production is constant, the cumulative production
quantity up to the innovation date t∗1 is simply
yM(t∗1) =
µ
τ
k0
¶β
(t∗1 − t0) (1.48)
Similarly, y(T ) equals the integral of the second phase’s per period production flows
between t∗1 and T , which is added to the cumulative quantity up to t∗1
yM(T ) = y(t∗1) +
µ
τ
k1
¶β
(T − t∗1) (1.49)
Equations (1.47), (1.48) and (1.49) are three independent equations that contain as
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many unknowns t∗1, y(t∗1) and y(T ). The parameters c, m, i, γ, λ, α, μ, δ and the
planning horizon, t0 and T are known to the firm. Thus the model can be solved
numerically.12
Results
When y(T ) is endogenous then (1.30) does not hold. Figure 1.3 illustrates, how
the variables of the model t∗1, y(t∗1), y(T ) and the prices p0, p1 are aﬀected by τ , ρ
(both upper part), λ, and γ (both lower part). The vertical axis of the cumulative
quantities is on the right side of each of the four panels, the vertical axis of all other
variables on the left side. In the upper left panel sales taxes (τ < 1) and subsidies
(τ > 1), in the upper right panel innovation subsidies (ρ < 1) and taxes (ρ > 1) vary.
Taxes/ subsidies are absent when τ = ρ = 1.13 Taxes and subsidies, either on sales
or innovation cost have the same eﬀect. Taxes increase the prices of both phases and
decrease the total cumulative production. The cumulative quantity at the innovation
date increases, whenever innovation is postponed.
The lower panel demonstrates what happens when the learning parameter λ varies
in a range of [0.5%, 1.5%], the lower right panel shows γ varying in a range of
[4.5%, 5.5%]. A rise in either learning parameter reduces both prices and increases
total cumulative quantity. Innovation is delayed when λ increases, it occurs earlier,
when γ increases. y(t∗1) moves into the same direction as t∗1. Subsidies and more in-
tense learning therefore are shown to reduce prices. A large λ decreases both prices
but the larger price p0 is charged by the monopolist longer, because a postponement of
innovation means that the length of phase 1 increases. In the absence of discounting
the average per period price is still smaller. But if consumer discounting is high, a
large λ might not be beneficial for buyers.
So far positive externalities, which justify subsidies have been ignored. An early
distribution of solar panels is preferred to a later date, to reduce the total carbon
dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. Both types of subsidies yield a lower p0 and
a lower t∗1, which together guarantee that with regards to time, more products are sold
12So far a process innovation was analyzed, it is however fairly simple to account for a product
innovation in this model. When a firm does not change its cost structure, but its product features,
then it is possible to change the demand function from one with an exponent of α to one with an
exponent diﬀerent from α after t∗1. This article considers the case, where consumers do not anticipate
price changes, thus the demand is equal before and after t∗1.
13The command ’fsolve’ of the computer program MATLAB solves systems of nonlinear equations.
It was used to derive t1, y(t1) and y(T ) based on (1.47), (1.48) and (1.49). The parameters have been
arbitrarily chosen. The results hold for other parameter sets, which yields a solution. The parameters
used here are: α = 0.9, γ = 0.05, λ = 0.01, t0 = 0, μ = 0.1, m = 1, c = 5, T = 50 and i = 20.
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Figure 1.3: A comparative analysis, when all variables are endogenous
earlier, because p0 > p1. Thus both subsidies are beneficial, when early distributions
play a role.
Results change drastically, when y(T ) is given. The results of the partial analysis,
(1.30) and (1.31) are supported by a numerical analysis, illustrated in figure 1.4. The
structure and the parameters of this figure are the same as in figure 1.3. In figure
1.3 a total cumulative production quantity of around y(T ) = 8 was derived. Figure
1.4 shows the results, when y(T ) = 8 is assumed to be given exogenously. Thus the
optimality condition (1.49) is excluded from the analysis. The results here have changed
dramatically: innovation is postponed when sales are subsidized. It occurs earlier,
when the innovation cost is subsidized. p0 increases when innovation is subsidized, it
decreases, when sales are subsidized. p1 moves into the opposite direction. These
results correspond with the analytical study above, where it was shown that ∂p0∂t1 < 0
and ∂p0∂t1 > 0 given y(T ) being exogenous. In the absence of subsidies the average
production unit price equals pAV = y(t∗1)p0 + [y(T )− y(t∗1)] p1 = 53.47. If a low sales
subsidy (τ = 1.05) is introduced, then the average price increases to pAV,S = 53.89. An
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innovation subsidy (ρ = 0.95) decreases the average price pAV,I = 53.27. If a regulator
cares about consumer prices, but it wants to subsidize the industry as it yields positive
externalities, then an innovation subsidy is preferred over a sales subsidy. Even though
an innovation subsidy increases p0, the average price decreases. In order to keep p0
from rising, a price constraint could be implemented for the first time phase.
Proposition 1.5 A price constraint during the first phase increases the consumer sur-
plus and decreases t∗1.
Proof. See appendix.
The lower panels show the aﬀect of the learning parameters. An increase of λ re-
duces p0 strongly, while p1 increases moderately. An increase of the second phase’s
learning parameter γ decreases p1 and increases p0. This observation is in line with
the results from the partial analysis (1.26) and (1.27). A change of any learning pa-
rameter aﬀects the timing of innovation, which influences the cumulative quantity at
the innovation date positively if t∗1 increases and negatively if t∗1 decreases. A change
of y(t∗1) aﬀects the prices as shown by (1.30) and (1.31). The average price decreases,
when either parameter increases. In the baseline case λ = 1%, γ = 5% and the average
price is pAV = 53.47. When λ = 1.5%, the average price increases to pAV,λ = 52.87,
when γ = 5.5% the average prices increases to pAV,γ = 52.67.
When the timing of early distribution plays a role, one has to examine a change of t∗1
and p0 to evaluate a policy or change of parameters in the same way as it has been done,
when y(T ) was endogenous. An innovation subsidy yields a higher p0, but innovation
occurs earlier than in the presence of a sales subsidy, where p0 is lower and t1 is larger.
With an innovation subsidy, fewer products are sold during the first phase. However,
the second phase, during which the number of products sold per period is larger (as
p1 < p0) begins earlier. Thus a regulator who is concerned about early distributions
prefers a sales subsidy towards an innovation subsidy if she is very impatient.
1.4 More on welfare eﬀects
This section contains a welfare analysis based on consumer and producer rents, which
are first derived. It is illustrated that the two types of subsidies of either innovation or
sales have diﬀerent eﬀects on consumer/ producer rents. This article does not contain
a general welfare analysis, which needs to verify clearly the positive externalities that
would induce a state to intervene. It would only be rational to do this, if one considers
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Figure 1.4: Comparative statics with y(T ) being exogenously determined
Learning and Technology Adoptions 29
a specific industry with information pertaining to the model’s underlying parameters,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. This section shows that an innovation (sales)
subsidy, which is fully financed through a sales (innovation) tax, changes the proportion
of consumer and producer rents. This way consumer rents could be increased, which
has a market power mitigating eﬀect.14 In this part all variables are endogenous. The
same inverse demand function holds; p = τ
1−αx
−α and in the numerical analysis, the
same set of parameters is used as before.
Consumer Rents: The per-period consumer rent during the first phase, CR0t equals
the area underneath the inverse demand function above the monopoly price.15
CR0t =
Z ∞
p0
x0[p0(t)]dp =
µ
τ
1− α
¶β Z ∞
p0
p−βdp =
µ
τ
1− α
¶β −1
1− βp
1−β
0
=
α
(1− α)2k
1−β
0 τ
β (1.50)
The price is substituted for k0/(1−α) and k0 = m+ γ−λγ ce−λy(t
∗
1)+ λγ ce
(γ−λ)y(t∗1)−γy(T ).16
The consumer rent over the entire first phase CR0 is
CR0 =
Z t∗1
t0
CR0tdt =
ατβk1−β0
(1− α)2 (t
∗
1 − t0) (1.51)
Applying the same steps again, the per period consumer rent after the innovation has
taken place CR1t and the consumer rent over all these periods, CR1 are
CR1t =
ατβk1−β1
(1− α)2 (1.52)
CR1 =
ατβk1−β1
(1− α)2 (T − t
∗
1) (1.53)
where k1 = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ).
14A valuation of such a measure is not part of this analysis. It depends on the specific industry to
judge, if such a procedure is justifiable.
15A necessary assumption is that the elasticity of demand exceeds one; β = 1α > 1, to guarantee
lim
p→∞
p1−β = 0.
16An increase of α is equivalent to a decrease of the demand elasticity. Consider (1.50), an increase
of α increases CR0t , which is quite intuitive. A monopolist picks a lower price when the elasticity is
large.
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Producer Rents: The producer rent of the monopoly, which equals its profit over the
entire planning horizon is
PR =
Z t∗1
t0
x0
¡
p0 − ce−λy(t) −m
¢
dt+
Z T
t∗1
x1
¡
p1 − ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(t) −m
¢
dt
=
µ
k0
1− α −m
¶µ
τ
k0
¶β
(t∗1 − t0) +
µ
k1
1− α −m
¶µ
τ
k1
¶β
(T − t∗1)
+
1
λ
£
ce−λy(t
∗
1) − ce−λy(t0)
¤
+
1
γ
£
ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ) − ce−λy(t∗1)
¤
(1.54)
Results
The results are summarized by figure 1.5. In the absence of government inter-
ventions consumer and producer rents are given by the horizontal line. After a sales
subsidy is introduced to the market, consumer and producer rents jump upwards to the
level, where the falling curves touch the vertical axis. Then an innovation tax comes
into place. It is depicted on the horizontal axis of each panel. An increase of the in-
novation tax reduces consumer and producer welfare, which is expressed by the falling
graph. Producer rents fall much faster than consumer rents. Hence a sales subsidy,
which is financed through an innovation tax has market power mitigating eﬀects. This
illustration shall not propose such a market intervention, rather it shows that either
subsidy type has diﬀerent eﬀects on producer and consumer rents. A similar figure
could be shown for welfare changes through an innovation subsidy that is financed by
a sales tax, where the upper curve is steeper for consumers.
1.5 Conclusion
The innovation of this model is that it is able to evaluate distribution and innovation
subsidies, while innovation costs depend on time, and learning depends on cumulative
production. This article examines the pricing of a monopolist and a public owned
firm in an environment, where the unit cost of production decreases through learning.
The learning intensity decreases with cumulative production. The firm can invest in
an innovation process. At the time, when research is successful, learning for a given
production quantity jumps. Thus a lower cost level can be achieved with less cumulative
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production added. So far models, which have included learning and innovation have
assumed that learning occurs through time. Hence these models are not applicable
to questions in the area of industrial organization, because learning has no eﬀect on
production or pricing.
In the absence of discounting it is shown that prices before and after the innova-
tion date are constant. The price of the first phase exceeds the price of the second
phase, hence there is a downward jump when the new technology is implemented. If
discounting is included in the analysis, prices before and after the innovation date rise,
because the return on learning falls. The problem of a monopolist and social planner
are quite similar, however, this analysis concentrates on the monopolist, because learn-
ing industries, although often severely subsidized, are generally not publicly owned.
Other central results of this paper are: innovation subsidies and sales subsidies reduce
the prices of both phases if all variables (the timing of innovation t1, the cumulative
production quantities at the innovation date, y(t1) and at the end of the planning hori-
zon, y(T )) are endogenous. Both types of subsidies induces the date of innovation to
occur earlier. Therefore the total quantity produced during the entire planning horizon
increases. The production plan in the presence of subsidies lies entirely above the pro-
duction plan without subsidies. Thus if early distributions yield positive externalities,
then subsidies on sales and on innovation contain an additional positive eﬀect.17 An-
other central result emerges, when the total production y(T ) is restricted.18 In this case
the two kinds of subsidies analyzed have diﬀerent eﬀects. Innovation subsidies decrease
the innovation date, but the price during the first phase increases (thus sales decrease).
It is shown that a price cap can reduce the first phase’s price, furthermore it induces
innovation to occur earlier. In order to evaluate an innovation subsidy one would need
to consider the negative eﬀect of the "early-distribution argument". Sales subsidies
induce the innovation timing to occur later, which means that for a longer period of
time, consumer pay the higher first phase’s price p0. The positive eﬀect is that p0 falls,
which is why the "early-distribution argument" might be in favour of sales subsidies.
The two subsidies considered have diﬀerent eﬀects on consumer and producer surplus.
It is also shown that a subsidy on innovation (sales), which is financed through a tax on
sales (innovation), changes the proportion of consumer and producer rents. Customers
generally benefit more from sales subsidies, producers from innovation subsidies.
17In the renewable energy sector early installations increase the positive externality. The total
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is reduced, because renewable energy sources are substi-
tutes to conventional energy sources that emit C02.
18For example in medium-sized countries, there is a fixed number of places, where wind energy
plants can be built.
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This paper does not conduct a general welfare analysis; for that one would need to
measure the cause for government subsidies (positive externalities). This would only
be feasible, if one would have specific learning parameters and the parameters of the
innovation cost function, which describe a specific market. This goes beyond the scope
of this article and is left for future work. It would also be interesting to show, how the
market equilibrium changes, when the date of innovation is anticipated by customers.
Most likely it would be optimal for some to wait and purchase the product after the
innovation date. This would reduce the learning before t1 unless innovation is delayed
by the firm. Another extension of this paper could add more insight by accounting for
a stochastic innovation process, market entry and technology switching cost.
Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of lemma 1.1
A transversality condition for the state variable solves for const1 in (1.13). The
total cost before t1 is sunk and can be ignored, η0(t1) has an influence only on future
cost. The area below the learning curve between y(t1) and y(t), for t ∈ [t1, T ] is defined
as
Γ [y(t)] =
Z y(t)
y(t1)
m+ce−λy(t1)−γ[v−y(t1)] dv = m[y(t)−y(t1)]+
c
γ
[e−λy(t1)−e−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)]
(1.55)
The time derivative is Γ˙ = dΓdt = x(t)[m+ce
−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)]], thus the time dependent
area under the learning curve or the total cost of the second phase isZ T
t1
Γ˙dt = [y(T )− y(t1)]m+
c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]
The usual methods of the principle of variations are used. At first the optimal
path of the production flow is displaced for the cost that occurs after t1; x(p1(t), t)→
x(p1(t), t) + δφ(t), −λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
Γ [y(t)] = y(T )m− y(t1)m−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
1
γ
ce−λy(t1)
Γ [y(t)]δ = [
Z T
t0
[x(t) + δφ(t)]dt]m− [
Z t1
t0
[x(t) + δφ(t)]dt]m
+
1
γ
ce−λ
? t1
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt − 1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
? t1
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
? T
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt
In a second step the displaced total cost after t1 (called Γ [y(t)]
δ) is diﬀerentiated with
respect to δ. The derivative is evaluated at δ = 0, employing the standard calculus of
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variations approach,
∂Γ [y(t)]δ
∂δ
|(δ=0) =
½
−λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¾Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt (1.56)
+{m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )}
Z T
t1
φ(t)dt
where (1.56) separates the terms multiplied by
R t1
t0
φ(t)dt and
R T
t1
φ(t)dt respectively.
For any t > t1, the marginal cost at T are collected. This result is similar to Spence’s
(1981) learning model. Given a production plan, he shows that when a firm extends
its production by one unit at any time, then the incremental cost is equal to marginal
cost at the end of the planning horizon. For t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 we collect another term;
−λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) < 0. For t = t1 the incremental cost is thus the
marginal cost of the second phase at T plus
h
−λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
i
. The
value of delaying the innovation by one production unit is obtained when this term
is multiplied by −1. Thus the first phase’s costate at the innovation date is η0(t1) =
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ).
Proof of proposition 1.2
When a firm produces an additional quantity 0 before the innovation occurs (t0 ≤
t ≤ t1) then the pricing rule (1.24) holds. The incremental cost for the first time phase
is computed next. The total cost is equal to
y(T )m+
c
λ
[1− e−λy(t1)] + c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] (1.57)
When the firm produces an additional unit 0 before the innovation takes place, then
total cost increases to
(y(T ) + 0)m+
c
λ
[1− e−λ[y(t1)+0]] + c
γ
[e−λ[y(t1)+0] − e−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] (1.58)
The incremental cost during the first phase is denoted by IC0
IC0 =
(1.58)− (1.57)
0
= c{−e
−λ[y(t1)+0]
λ0
− e−λy(t1)] + e
−λ[y(t1)+0] − e−λy(t1)
γ0
.
−e
−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
γ0
}+m (1.59)
It needs to be shown that (1.24) is equivalent to setting the marginal revenue equal
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to the incremental cost (1.59). ce−λy(t1) is equivalent to lim
0−>0
− cλ0 [e
−λ[y(t1)+0] −
e−λy(t1)] and −λγ e−λy(t1) to lim0−>0
e−λ[y(t1)+dx]−e−λy(t1)
γ0
. In order to show the equivalence
of the third term, it has to be transformed: lim
0−>0
− 1γ0 [e
−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] −
e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] = − 1γ0 [e
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )−λ0 − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]. It follows that
lim
0−>0
− 1γ0 [e
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )−λ0−e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] = λγ e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ), where the fol-
lowing rule was applied: lim
0−>0
ea−λ0−ea
0
= ea lim
0−>0
e−λ−1
 = e
aλ, for any constant a ∈ R.
This completes the first part of the proof. During the first time phase, the monopolist
behaves optimally, when it sets marginal revenue equal to incremental cost at each
instant of time. Next, the second time phase ∇t1 ≤ t ≤ T is analyzed. (1.25) is the
optimality condition during this phase. When the firm produces an additional unit 1
after the innovation has occurred, total cost (1.57) increases to
(y(T ) + 1)m+
c
λ
[1− e−λy(t1)] + c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]] (1.60)
IC1 is the incremental cost that occurs through an additional 1 after t1
IC1 =
(1.60)− (1.57)
1
=
c0
γ1
[e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]] (1.61)
(1.25) is equivalent to (1.61), because ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] = lim
1−>0
c
γ1
[e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]].
Proof of proposition 1.3
Pricing during the first phase ( t ≤ t1); when r 6= 0
This section reconstructs equation (1.24) in the presence of discounting with t0 = 0.
The costate that contains a discount rate is denoted by ψ0(t) = e−rt η0(t). The
transversality condition for ψ0(t1) has to be derived. It is shown that (1.12) holds,
when η0(t) is substituted for ψ0(t)
∂H
∂p0(t)
= x0(p0(t), t)+p0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
−∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
(m+ce−λy(t))+ψ0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
.
= 0
⇔ p0(1−
1
ε(t)
) = m+ ce−λy(t) − ψ0(t) (1.62)
The second first order condition (1.13), becomes
ψ˙0(t)− rψ0(t) = −
∂H
∂y0(t)
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multiplying this equation by e−rt and transforming yields
⇔ e−rtψ˙0(t)− re−rtψ0(t) = −e−rt
∂H
∂y0(t)
⇔ e−rtψ0(t) + const3 =
Z £
e−rt(−λ)ce−λy0(t)x0(t)
¤
dt
⇔ e−rtψ0(t) + const3 = e−rtce−λy0(t) + r
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
⇔ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt− ertconst3 (1.63)
In order to find an expression of the costate at the innovation date ψ0(t1), the total
cost that occurs after the innovation is expressed by V .
V =
Z T
t1
©
x1(p1(t)(m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t))e−rt
ª
dt
Integration by parts yields:
V =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
my1(t)−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)
¾
dt
+e−rt
½
my(T )− 1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) −my(t1) +
1
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¾
Applying the usual methods of the principle of variations; the optimal path of the
production flow x(p1(t), t)→ x(p1(t), t) + δφ(t) in V is displaced, before its derivative
is evaluated at δ = 0 according to the standard calculus of variations approach.
V =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
m
Z t
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
? t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
? t
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt
¾
dt
+e−rt{m
Z T
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
? t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
? T
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt
−m
Z t1
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt+
1
γ
ce−λ
? t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt}
∂V
∂δ
]δ=0 =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
m
Z t
t0
φ(t)dt− γ − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t
t0
φ(t)dt
¾
dt
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φ(t)dt}
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m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
¤ Z t
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φ(τ)dτ − γ − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt
¾
dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
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£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
¤
φ(t)dt}
(1.64)
The term
Z T
t1
re−rt
n
γ−λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
R t1
t0
φ(t)dt
o
dt can be ignored. It originates from
displacing the cumulative quantity before t1 after the innovation has already taken
place. As the firm cannot change y(t1) after t1, it cannot eﬀect the cost during the first
time phase at t1. It just has an eﬀect on the second phase’s cost. One can also examine
this term itself and recognize that for any t it is zero, because when t < t1 then the
first integral becomes zero, when t > t1, then the second integral is zero. Hence (1.64)
becomes Z T
t1
re−rt
½£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
¤ Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
¤
φ(t)dt}
(1.65)
One can replace the variables of the first term above. The range of τ is [t0, t] and that
of t is: [t1, T ] → t0 ≤ τ ≤ t ≤ T . After replacing the variables t0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T , the
range is [t, T ] for τ , when t > t1 and it is [t1, T ] when t ≤ t1. Before the swap, t was
larger than t1 hence τ is larger than t1 after the swap. When t is smaller than t1, then
τ ’s lower limit is t1. When t is larger than t1, then τ ’s lower limit is t. The new range
of t is [t0, T ]. Figure 1.6 illustrates the range before and after replacing the variables t
and τ .
(1.65) can be transformed to
Z t1
t0
re−rt
½£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
¤ Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt+
Z T
t1
re−rt
½£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
¤ Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt
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Figure 1.6: Exchanging variables
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+e−rt{
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The variables are replaced next.
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ce−λy(t1)
¸
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(1.66)
The same reasoning as in (1.56) applies here hence the costate of the first phase with
a non-zero discount rate at t1 equals,
→ ψ0(t1) = e−rt1
∙
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¸
−
Z T
t1
r
£
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
¤
e−rτdτ
(1.67)
The constant const3 is found in the following.
⇔ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt− ertconst3
→ ψ0(t1) = ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
− ert1const3
→ ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
− ert1const3 =
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r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ
+ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
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Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
It is substituted into the costate function (1.67), which is
→ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
−
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1−
Z T
t1
r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ−ce−λy0(t1)
(1.68)
Finally one can substitute the costate in equation (1.68) to find an expression, how the
monopolist sets the price during the first time phase.
p0(1−
1
ε(t)
) = m+ ce−λy0(t) − ce−λy0(t) − rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
+
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1+
Z T
t1
r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ+ce−λy0(t1)
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
⇔MR0(t) = m+
∙
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γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1 + ce−λy0(t1)
+
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
− rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt+ r
Z T
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[m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ
⇔MR0(t) = m+
λ
γ
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γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
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+r
Z t1
t
£
m+ ce−λy0(τ)
¤
e−r(τ−t)dτ + r
Z T
t1
[m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−r(τ−t)dτ (1.69)
With a positive discount rate, there are two additional terms in the optimality condi-
tion. These reflect the fact that the return to experience or learning, which is expressed
by a lower future cost, matters less, due to the presence of discounting. The optimal
plan is to increase p0 and thus present profits at the expense of future profits. Note
that (1.69) reduces to (1.24), when r = 0.
Pricing during the second phase ( t > t1); when r 6= 0
(1.25) and (1.17) can be rewritten to account for discounting
MR1(t) = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t) − ψ1(t) (1.70)
ψ1(t) = ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(t) + rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt− e−rtconst4 (1.71)
Extending production at t = T does not increase the profit, if the firm behaves opti-
mally. Hence ψ1(T ) = 0.
→ ψ1(T ) = ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T ) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
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∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
= e−rT const4
→ ψ1(t) = ce
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Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt− ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T )
−
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∙
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¸
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During the second phase, the monopolist sets p1 such that
⇔MR1(t) = m+ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T ) + r
Z T
t
h
m+ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(τ)
i
e−r(τ−t)dτ (1.72)
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With a positive discount rate, there is an additional term. Again, the optimality
condition reflects the fact that the return to experience is in the future, which is
discounted, thus p1 rises. (1.72) reduces to (1.25), when r = 0.
Proof of proposition 1.5
For a fix total production quantity y(T ), it is shown analytically and numerically
that a subsidy on innovation cost, induces the innovation to occur earlier and thus p0 to
increase. The welfare loss could be encountered by a price ceiling during this phase. The
price ceiling would have a counter eﬀect, when the date of innovation is delayed by the
introduction of a price constraint. In this case, consumers would pay the higher price p0
for a longer period of time. The answer is a straightforward extension of the preceding
section and is based on a method that is used in Rees (1986). p0 is constant, therefore
either the price constraint p− p0 ≥ 0, where p is the price ceiling binds over the entire
interval [t0, t1] or it does not bind at all. When it does not bind, it has no eﬀect. Assume
it does bind, and p∗0 > p, where p∗0 is the optimal price set by the monopolist; in this
case the monopolist looses some of its profit due to the price cap. This loss is denoted
byR[x0(p)], withRx0 < 0, andR > 0 if x < x(p0). The per period quantity x0 on which
R depends upon is considered as a function of p. Whenever p0 ≤ p, then x > x(p0) and
R ≡ 0. The new objective is Max
x0,x1,t1
MP 0 =
Z t1
t0
[π0(t)−R(x(p))] dt+
Z T
t1
π1(t)dt−a(t1)
subject to the constraints (1.5)-(1.9). The problem can be divided into two segments.
The maximand over the first phase [t0, t1] is V ∗0 ≡Max
R t1
t0
[π0(t)−R(x0(p0))] dt−a(t1),
that of the second phase is V ∗1 ≡Max
Z T
t1
π1(t)dt. t∗1 maximizes the sum V ∗0 + V ∗1 , and
satisfies ∂ (V ∗0 + V ∗1 ) /t1 $ 0, from which the optimality condition a0(t∗1) + R(x(p0)) =
π0(t∗1)+ η0(t∗1)x[p0(t∗1), t∗1] − π1(t∗1) − η1(t∗1)x[p1(t∗1), t∗1] can be derived. Aside from R
the optimality condition is the same as (1.39). The introduction of a price constraint
decreases t∗1. The low price p1 is charged for a longer time span, because the length of
phase 2 increases. In addition, an earlier innovation date causes p1 to decrease further.
Summing up one can say that the introduction of a price constraint along with
an innovation subsidy increases consumer rents during the entire planning horizon.
Producers receive lower revenues, when y(T ) is fixed, because prices do not increase,
however, their innovation cost decline, due to the subsidy. Their production cost
decrease, because producers learn with a larger learning parameter sooner.
Chapter 2
Optimal Fertility Decisions in a
Life-Cycle Model ∗
2.1 Introduction
Three of the most significant socioeconomic developments in virtually all the developed
economies in the second half of the 20’th century were the large increases in female
labor force participation, the falls in fertility rates and the increases in divorce rates. A
number of exogenous factors clearly have played an important role in these, for example
the growth in demand for female labor, the availability of the contraceptive pill, and
changes in divorce laws that have made divorce easier and less costly to obtain. It seems
also clear however that there are several possible interrelationships among these three
developments: child care and work in the market are alternative uses of a mother’s
time and increasing wage rates raise the opportunity cost of children; the attempt
to build a career could lead to postponing childbirth and having fewer children as a
result of this; the perception of an increased chance that the marriage might end in
divorce could lead to a decision to have fewer children. At the same time, there is
considerable heterogeneity across households in respect of female market labor supply,
even after controlling for wage rates and number and ages of children, and it does not
seem adequate simply to regard this as due to preference heterogeneity.19
In this paper we develop a new theoretical framework to try to explore some of these
interrelationships, and to consider possible explanations for them, that are rooted in
optimal intertemporal decision taking over the life cycle. A woman’s human capital,
∗This chapter is a joint work with Ray Rees.
19See Apps and Rees (2009), chapters 1 and 5, where this is discussed at some length.
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and therefore her wage rate, is endogenous and depends first on the choice of how much
formal education to acquire, and secondly on how much work experience to gain in the
labor market. Both these decisions aﬀect the timing and number of births, and in turn
are aﬀected by them because of the demands on time made by child care. We first set
out a model which allows these interacting decisions to be formally analyzed. We then
extend it by analyzing the eﬀect on the timing and number of births of perceptions of
the likelihood of divorce.
There is a large literature that asks how children aﬀect such economic variables
as demand patterns and consumption. In that context they examine intertemporal
decisions and equality questions. For an overview of this literature see Browning (1992)
and (Becker 1993). Most of the literature that deals with the eﬀect of children on
labor supply concentrates on female labor participation, because the eﬀect on male
labor market participation has so far been quite low.20 Ward and Butz (1980) show
empirically that couples time their births to avoid periods when the female’s income is
high. Heckman and Walker (1990) show that the negative (positive) relation between
the optimal number of children (fertility timing) and female wages is robust across a
variety of empirical specifications, while they cannot prove that the same holds for
male wages. Based on this literature we focus on the female as the utility maximizing
individual throughout this paper.
In order to assess the costs of raising children, one has to take account of the timing
of births. Labor market earnings depend on work experience. In an early study Happel
et al. (1984) set up a model in which a woman works before she gives birth and gains
labor market experience, and her income increases with experience. After giving birth
a woman takes some time oﬀ to raise her child or children. When she re-enters the labor
market, some of her experience has decayed by some constant factor. It is assumed to
be zero for unskilled workers, in which case there is no timing preference. Otherwise a
woman would want to either have children in the very beginning of her marriage, when
she has not accumulated any labor experience before her marriage or shortly before
her period of fecundity ends. In an empirical paper using Swedish data, Walker (1995)
decomposes the total costs of children into the opportunity costs of not working, the
foregone return for foregone human capital investment and the net direct. The model
in this paper will take account of this decomposition and solve for the optimal timing
in a continuous time framework.
Gustafsson (2001) gives a nice overview of the past theoretical and empirical re-
search on the optimal timing of childbirth. Cigno (1991) analyses a dynamic model
20Browning (1992) pp. 1449-1464
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in discrete time, in which the female’s income depends on her education level as well
as on labor market experience. He derives the optimality conditions that describe an
optimal fertility profile, with the value of the number of children growing at the rate
of interest. Along these lines he demonstrates that postponing childbirth raises the
income loss and lowers the human capital loss of a birth, because income rises with
labor experience. In order to go a step further in this paper we set up a model in
continuous time, which allows us to find an explicit solution for the fertility timing
and number of children. Blackburn et al. (1993) show theoretical linkages between
a woman’s fertility timing and her investments in human capital and income profile.
A late child bearer accumulates more human capital when the discount rate is larger
than the economy-wide growth rate of wages for late child bearers.
In our baseline model in the next section, we examine the eﬀects of the income level
on our two variables of interest: the timing of fertility and the number of children. We
then go on to analyze how the return to labor market experience within the diﬀerent
life cycle phases aﬀects the timing and number of births, which is new in this literature.
We also have various cost parameters included for the purpose of deriving some policy
implications. Empirically it can be shown that less educated families decide to have
more children (De la Croix and Doepke, 2003). This model can be extended with an
education phase. Empirically it can be shown that less educated families decide to have
more children (De la Croix and Doepke, 2003). This model can be extended to include
an education phase, where ability plays a role. Individuals that would benefit from a
higher return to education, enter the labor market later, and have later, fewer children.
We waived this addition though as it does not add much to the existing literature.
The major part of the fertility literature is embedded in a deterministic framework.
Exceptions are Newman (1983) and Hotz and Miller (1986). Drastic simplifications
have to be made to keep these models manageable. As a consequence these models
have bang-bang solutions, where the probability of giving birth is piled up either at
the beginning of marriage or at the end of a woman’s period of fecundity. Our model
introduces some stochastic elements by introducing the possibility of divorce. We then
show how this possibility influences the optimal timing and number of childbirths, and
this appears to be new to the literature.
2.2 The Baseline Model
We assume that the working life of a representative woman falls into 3 stages (Figure:
2.1):
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1. During the first phase t ∈ [t1; t2] she works full-time. A utility function that ac-
counts for leisure and consumption that can solve for the optimal control problem
is quasilinear in leisure and linear in consumption xi(t). Total time is assumed
to be Ψ, and labor is denoted by li(t), where i is the subscript for the present
phase the representative is in. An individual gains utility from consuming the
representative good and leisure: u1 [x1(t), l1(t)] = x1(t)+ ln [Ψ− l1(t)]. The price
of consumption is normalized to 1. All income is consumed, hence the budget
constraint is given by w(θ, L(t))l1(t) = x1(t), where the income w(θ, L(t)) de-
pends on ability θ and labor experience gained thus far, L(t) =
R t
t1
l(t)dt. Labor
experience L(t) is the state variable of this problem and to simplify notations it
is denoted L(t) = Lt. L0 is assumed to be zero, hence the the first income w(θ, 0)
depends solely on ability. Education could also be part of this ability parameter.
It can be shown how a proceeding education phase influences fertility; the timing
when she enters the labor market and her initial income becomes endogenous.
This reflects how, flexible this model setup is, and that it can be used for a wide
variety of policy evaluations that aﬀect fertility. In order to keep the model man-
ageable to avoid adding more phases, we make the simplifying assumption that
all children are born at the same time t2 and do not require any child-care after
t3. The length of phase 3 has length h(k) and depends on the number of children
k. The decisions, how when to have children and how many children one wants
to have depend on each other in real life. This is also reflected by this model
setup as that t2 and k are derived simultaneously.
2. During phase two, when t ∈ [t2, t3], the woman has children and works part-time.
When she is married and does not get divorced, which we assume in the baseline
model, then time costs for k children that have been born at t2 are c(k, t2) and
the monetary costs are m(k, t2), which are lower that full costs. The father
bears the rest of the costs. For the purpose of this article, we do not need to
model the proportions. After divorce a woman’s time costs and monetary costs
increase to cd(k, t2) andmd(k, t2), respectively. cd andmd are strictly less than full
costs as the father has to bear some part that can be specified with appropriate
parameters. Having k children introduces not just costs but also benefits from
having children during phase two and three vi(k); i ∈ (2, 3). The utility function
is given by u2 [x2(t), l2(t)] = x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k). The labor
income is consumed partly by the mother and partly by her children, the budget
constraint is therefore w(Lt)l2(t) = x2(t)+m(k, t2), where the monetary costs for
the mother are smaller than the total monetary costs of having k children, because
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the husband is assumed to contribute his part as well. How much he contributes
depends on diﬀerent aspects such as his own income, outside options for having k
children with this particular woman, and the intra-household distribution. This
model could be extended to take these complex issues into consideration. They
are left open for further research.
3. During the last phase t ∈ [t3, T ], the individual works full-time again. After
t3 children are older and do not have to be looked after. A woman consumes
the consumption good x3(t), leisure [Ψ− l3(t)] and retrieves utility from having
k children v3(k), thus u3 [x3(t), l3(t)] = x3(t) + ln [Ψ− l3] + v3(k). The budget
constraint in this phase is w(Lt3)l3(t) = x3(t). The wage depends on the labor
experience accumulated until the end of phase 2. We assume that the wage is
constant during this phase for simplicity. We also solved the model for a non-
constant wage, but the main results do not change. Empirically one can observe
that wage often even decreases before retirement, hence labor experience gained
then does not pay oﬀ. At time T the planning horizon ends. The retirement shall
not play any role in this analysis.
The Hamiltonian for phase i ∈ [1, 2, 3] is given by H [xi(t), li(t), ηi(t)] = ui +
ηi(t)li(t), where ηi(t) is the costate function of this optimal control problem. Dur-
ing the last phase η3(t) = 0, because the wage rate is constant then. The derivative of
the income with respect to labor experience is denoted as ∂wi(Lt)∂Lt = αi (, Lt). αi (Lt) is
larger during phase 1 than during phase 2 when a mother works part-time. A possible
income scheme is shown by figure 2.1, where we show income per time period. There
are no discontinuous vertical movements, because we assume the individual keeps earn-
ing the same hourly wage rate, when she enters a new phase, because experience does
not decay overnight.
The planning horizon begins at t = t1 and ends at t = T ; both exogenous. t2
is determined in the baseline model, t3 shall be equal to t2 plus h(k), which is time
independent and depends on the number of k children; t3 = t2+h(k). h(k) characterizes
the length of time of parental leave. For simplicity however, and because we are not
interested in the choice of interval between births, we assume that all children are born
at t2. We do not assume that skills deteriorate during phase two as Happel et al.
(1984), but that could be another possible extension.
We solve the problem for each of the three phases of a woman’s life backward from
the last. We develop necessary conditions for this problem. First we take t2 ∈ [t1, T ]
and k > 0 as given and solve for the optimal consumption and labor supply. In a next
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Figure 2.1: The per period income over a life-cycle.
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step we characterize the optimal time of childbirth t2. By a theorem of Hestens, given
the problem with t2 and k fixed, we can define ηi(t) on [ti, ti+1] ; i = 1, 2 as the costate
variables of labor experience.21
2.2.1 Solving the model
Phase 3: t ∈ [t3, T ]
An individual’s objective is to maximize
R T
t3
{x3(t) + ln [Ψ− l3] + v3(k)} dt subject to
the budget constraint. The Lagrangian is
Γ [x3(t), l3(t)] = x3(t) + ln [Ψ− l3] + v3(k) + λ3(t) [w(Lt3)l3(t)− x3(t)] (2.1)
where λ3(t) is the Lagrangian multiplier for phase three. For simplicity we assume no
discounting. A positive discount rate complicates the analysis unnecessarily and leads
to a decrease in labor supply, because experience is valued less. A proof follows the
same lines as proposition 1.3 of chapter 1. The constant labor supply and consumption
can be expressed in terms of the wage rate achieved at t3.
l∗3 = Ψ−
1
w(Lt3)
(2.2)
x∗3 = Ψw(Lt3)− 1 (2.3)
Phase 2: t ∈ [t2, t3]
The computations are more refined in this section as that labor experience ob-
tained within this phase has a future return. The objective here is to maximizeR t3
t2
{x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)} dt + V ∗3 subject to the budget constraint
w(Lt)l2(t) = x2(t) +m(k, t2) and
·
Lt = l2(t). V ∗3 is the optimally chosen utility stream
from t3 to T , given some labor experience level Lt2. The choice of labor in this phase
determines Lt3 and thus eﬀects V ∗3 . The Lagrangian is
Γ2 [x2(t), l2(t)] = x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k) (2.4)
+η2(t)l2(t) + λ2(t) [w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−m(k, t2)]
21see Takayama p.658
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From the first order condition of labor and the general optimal control condition,
where the time derivative of the costate is equal to the negative Hamiltonian’s derivative
with respect to the state variable (labor experience), we determine the following two
expressions after substituting the optimality condition for consumption λ2(t) = 1. Time
derivatives are denoted by a dot above a time dependent function.
l2(t) = Ψ− c(k, t2)−
1
η2(t) + w(Lt)
(2.5)
·
η2(t) = −
·
w(Lt) (2.6)
The transversality condition here is an expression of the costate at t3. Working an
additional hour at t3 increases her income and has a future return of
η2(t3) =
∂w(Lt)
∂Lt
|t=t3
Z T
t3
l3dt (2.7)
Given the transversality condition (2.7) and the transformation
l2(t)
∂w(θ, Lt)
∂Lt
=
·
w(Lt) (2.8)
we can transform (2.6) in a way such that the costate function becomes
η2(t) = w(Lt3)− w(Lt) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ] (2.9)
where α2(t3) =
∂w(Lt)
∂Lt
|t=t3 . Using (2.5) and (2.9) one can solve for the optimal labor
supply, which is time independent and its consumption counterpart, which does depend
on time,
l∗2 = Ψ− c(k, t2)−
1
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ]
(2.10)
x∗2(t) = w(Lt)[Ψ− c(k, t2)−
1
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ]
]−m(k, t2) (2.11)
The labor supply is also independent from time in phase 1, which we show next. This
result is driven by a decreasing return of experience, as the length of time between
any t and T , when earlier accumulated experience pays oﬀ, decreases. On the other
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side income increases with experience, which would increase labor supply. Both eﬀects
are equally strong and cancel out. This result can be compared to the pricing of
a monopolist that produces a single good and learns through production, which is
reflected by decreasing unit costs. At each period it sets an optimal price such that its
marginal revenue equals the marginal costs at the end of its planning horizon. Given
a constant elasticity of demand its price is constant, even though its marginal costs
decrease (Spence, 1981). One can also draw the parallel to chapter 1, where in section
1.2.1 it is shown that a social planner sets diﬀerent prices across phases, but the same
price across periods within a phase.
This feature is useful considering the fact that we do not view changes in labor
supply from period to period in reality either. Hence this model is more realistic owing
to a derivable constant labor supply. Furthermore we derive an increasing consumption
function mimicing reality.
Phase 1: t ∈ [t1, t2]
An individual’s objective is to maximize V1 =
R t2
t1
{x1(t) + ln [Ψ− l1(t)]} dt+ V ∗2 dt
subject to the budget constraint and
·
Lt = l1(t). The choice of labor in this phase
determines Lt2 and influences the utility stream after t = t2, which is denoted by V ∗2 .
The solution to the problem is
l∗1 = Ψ−
1
w(Lt2) + α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ]
(2.12)
x∗1(t) = w(Lt)
∙
Ψ− 1
w(Lt2) + α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ]
¸
(2.13)
The costate functional for phase 2 has been derived following the same lines that have
led to (2.7)
η1(t) = w(Lt2)− w(Lt) + α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ] (2.14)
Conclusively we are able to determine the labor supplies for each phase and thus
expressions for cumulative labor supplies at the end of phases 1-3. These expressions
are needed, when solving for the timing of fertility. They are given by the integrals
of instantaneous labor supplies (2.2), (2.10) and (2.12). Since the per period labor
supplies are all constants, we can multiply them with the length of each respective
phase and add the experience gained in former phases to find the labor experience at
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the end of each phase.
Lt2 =
∙
Ψ− 1
w(Lt2) + α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ]
¸
(t2 − t1) (2.15)
Lt3 = Lt2 +
∙
Ψ− c(k, t2)−
1
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3]
¸
(t3 − t2) (2.16)
LT = Lt3 +
∙
Ψ− 1
w(Lt3)
¸
(T − t3) (2.17)
Jumps of Costates
Proposition 2.1 There is a discontinuous downward jump (upward) jump, when the
return of labor experience is larger (smaller) during the first of the two phases. Further-
more one can show that the quotient of the two consecutive phases 1 and 2 is constant
at t2, when the experience derivative of income is constant within each phase.
Proof. For αi(t) 6= const
η1(t2)
η2(t2)
=
α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ]
w(Lt3)− w(Lt2) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ]
=
α1(t2) [LT − Lt2 ]R t3
t2
α2(t)ltdt+ α2(t3)
R T
t3
Ltdt
(2.18)
When the experience return is larger at a given point in time during phase 1 (in
particular at t2) than during phase 2, then the quotient (2.18) must be greater than
one. Hence there is a downward jump of labour supply at t2.
For αi(t) = αi = const
η1(t2)
η2(t2)
=
α1 [LT − Lt2]
w(Lt3)− w(Lt2) + α2 [LT − Lt3 ]
=
α1
α2
(2.19)
If α2(t) decreases with time, then the denominator of (2.18) is smaller than that of
(2.19), hence (2.18) must be larger than (2.19), which means that the upward jump is
larger when αi(t) 6= const.
In order to simplify the continuative analysis, we assume that a1 and α2 are independent
of time but a1 > α2 as discussed earlier. The income payments at the end of phase one
and two are then equal to the expressions,
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w(Lt2) = w(Lt1) + α1Lt2 (2.20)
w(Lt3) = w(Lt2) + α2 [Lt3 − Lt2 ] (2.21)
w(LT ) = w(Lt3) (2.22)
where w(Lt1) = w(0) is the income of an individual who has recently commenced
working. (2.22) reminds us that there is no return on experience gained during phase
3. How results change, when we substitute w(LT ) = w(Lt3) + α3 [LT − Lt3] for (2.22)
where the experience return during phase 3 is α3 6= 0, is briefly explored later.
2.2.2 The optimality condition for the timing of childbirth
There is the desire to have children earlier in life; and the probability that a child
has a disability increases with the mother’s age. This is modelled by a change in the
expected cost. To keep things simple, we assume that c(k, t2) andm(k, t2) increase with
certainty, when childbirth is delayed. Advanced medical research makes it feasible to
give birth later in life, but such procedures are expensive. In addition to which, parents
that are wealthier spend more money on raising their children. Since income increases
in this model continuously, monetary costs m(k, t2) increase with t2. Besides a positive
derivative of m(k, t2) with respect to t2, we argue for a positive relation of time costs
c(k, t2) and childbirth. The same rules that apply on the labor market also apply when
people raise children: younger people can generally adopt better to changing market
conditions and learn faster. A mother in her early 20s might be still able to drop oﬀ
her children at the kindergarten, before going to her part-time job and pick them up
again in the afternoon. Furthermore we assume that the length of time required to
raise children is longer, when there are more children; h0(k) > 0. This term can be used
later to evaluate policy implications for schools, where children can stay all day long.
Once children are old enough to go to these schools, both parents could begin to work
full-time again. In the model the individual then enters phase 3. We included monetary
costs for phase 3 in an earlier working paper. Results shall be briefly discussed below.
With t2 fixed, one can take the utility stream from t1up to T and diﬀerentiate this
expression with respect to t2. This expression must be equal to zero at the optimal
time of childbirth t∗2. Now consider the following three sub-problems:
For t ∈ [t1, t2] t1 and t2 fixed
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SP ∗1 = max
x1(t)
Z t2
t1
{x1(t) + ln [Ψ− l1(t)]} dt (2.23)
s.t.
·
l1(t) = l1(t) and w(Lt)l1(t)− x1(t) = 0
For t ∈ [t2, t2 + h(k)] t2 and h(k) fixed
SP ∗2 = max
x2(t)
Z t2+h(k)
t2
{x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)} dt (2.24)
s.t.
·
l2(t) = l2(t) and w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−m(k, t2) = 0
For t ∈ [t2 + h(k), T ] t2, h(k) and T fixed
SP ∗3 = max
x3(t)
Z T
t2+h(k)
{x3(t) + ln [Ψ− l3(t)] + v3(k)} dt (2.25)
s.t.
·
l3(t) = l3(t) and w(Lt)l3(t)− x3(t) = 0
We need to use the Leibniz Rule to derive ∂SP
∗
i
∂t2
for i = 1, 2 and 3. For each phase i we
receive three terms:
1. The integral of ∂SP
∗
i
∂t2
with the corresponding phase’s bounds.
2. We subtract the t2 derivative of the lower bound of phase i, which is multiplied
by the Hamiltonian evaluated at the lower bound.
3. Finally we add the derivative of the upper bound with respect to t2, which is
multiplied by the Hamiltonian evaluated at that point.
Phase 1
∂SP ∗1
∂t2
= H∗1 (t2) (2.26)
Applying the envelope theorem, the first term is zero. The lower bound is independent
of childbirth, hence term two is zero. The third term; H∗1 (t2) intuitively means that an
incremental increase in t2 comes along with additional per period utility gained during
phase one at t2.
Phase 2
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∂SP ∗2
∂t2
= −∂c(k, t2)
∂t2
h(k)
Ψ− l∗2 − c(k, t2)
−H∗2 (t2) +H2(t3) (2.27)
One can show that H∗2(t3)−H∗2 (t2) = 0. This result is due to the fact that in the
presence of learning, the per period utility within each phase is constant. The change
in utility through an increase in consumption is completely oﬀset by the change of
utility through the decrease of the experience value. One can draw a parallel to the
earlier discussion in section 2.2.1. Hamiltonians within any phase are of equal value
independent of the period in which they are evaluated.
Applying the envelope theorem, the first term is −∂c(k,t2)∂t2
h(k)
Ψ−l∗3−c(k,t2)
and does not
vanish here, because the derivative with respect to c(k, t2) is not equal to zero. However
the derivatives of the per period Hamiltonian with respect to x∗2(t), l∗2 and η∗2(t), which
have already been chosen optimally are zero. c(k, t2) depends on the number of children
and the timing of childbirth, which are not optimal at this stage yet. The change of
time costs has to be paid for the length of this phase, h(k). The second term comes
from a decrease of phase two’s utility at the original t2 before the change, the third
term from an increase of phase two’s utility at t3. Phase two can be seen as shifted to
the right within the time interval.
Phase 3
∂SP ∗3
∂t2
= −H∗3 (t3) (2.28)
The envelope theorem allows the first term to vanish, the third term does not occur
here either, because the upper bound of phase four T is exogenously given and hence
independent of t2. −H∗3 (t3) expresses the fact that phase three becomes shorter and
loses an incremental period at t3.
Adding (2.26), (2.27), (2.28) and setting them equal to zero gives the optimality
condition for the optimal timing of childbirth, where k is still assumed to be fixed.
H∗1 (t2)−
∂c(k, t2)
∂t2
h(k)
Ψ− l∗3 − c(k, t2)
−H∗3 (t3)
.
= 0 (2.29)
2.2.3 The optimality condition for the number of children
Again we use the Leibniz rule and the Envelope theorem with the same method used
to derive the t∗2-optimality condition. The timing of childbirth depends on phase one’s
utility stream, but the number of children k does not, thus ∂SP
∗
1
∂k = 0.
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The length of phase two and three changes with the number of children. The terms
that aﬀect the number of children are the costs and benefits, while children are young
(phase 2), the benefits when they are older (phase 3), and the length of phase 2, h(k).
Phase 2
∂SP ∗2
∂k
=
∙
∂v2(k)
∂k
− ∂c(k, t2)
∂k
1
Ψ− l∗2 − c(k, t2)
¸
h(k) +H∗2(t3)h
0(k) (2.30)
The first term is the change of the per period utility of phase two from an increase
of benefits from having more children, subtracted by additional costs multiplied by the
length of this phase h(k). The second term is the additional utility from an increase
of length of phase two.
Phase 3
∂SP ∗3
∂k
= (T − t3)
∂v3(k)
∂k
− h0(k)H∗3 (t3) (2.31)
When more children are born, the additional benefit from having them is accounted
for by the first term. Phase 3 becomes shorter through an increase of length in phase
2 when more children are present (second term) .
The k∗-optimality condition is thus given by
h(k)
∙
∂v2(k)
∂k
− ∂c(k, t2)
∂k
1
Ψ− l∗2 − c(k, t2)
¸
+(T−t3)
∂v3(k)
∂k
+h0(k) [H∗2(t3)−H∗3 (t3)]
.
= 0
(2.32)
We derive the optimal number of children and the optimal timing of childbirth
simultaneously. The equation that describes the optimal number of children is given
by (2.32), which depends on t2 just in the same way as (2.29), the equation that
characterizes the optimal date of childbirth.
Given (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.20), (2.21), (2.22), (2.29) and (2.32) we can solve for
the optimal number of children and timing of childbirth numerically. Besides these two
variables, we can also solve for cumulative labor experience at t2, t3, and T and the
per period income level at these points. The characterization of an analytical solution
would be extremely tedious, because one would have to apply the implicit function
theorem for eight equations, where each of them depends on all other seven equations.
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Functional form Phase
Time costs c(k, t2) = c1kβ1 + c−12 t
β2
2 2
Utility from Children v2(k) = c3kβ3 2
Utility from Children v3(k) = c4kβ3 3
Length of phase 2 h(k) = c5kβ4 2
Monetary costs m(k, t2) = c6kβ5 + c−12 t
β2
2 2
Table 2.1: Functional forms
2.2.4 Results
We need to make assumptions regarding the functional forms of the cost functions,
utility derived from children and the length of phase two. These are presented in table
2.1.22
All functions in table 2.1 are concave in the number of children k. When they
depend on the timing of childbirth, then they are convex in t2. The parameters have
also been chosen such that the optimal number of children is 2 .2 to reflect the number
of children a woman must have on average to keep the population at a constant level.
In 2006, the average age of a woman receiving her first child in the 25 European Union
member states was approximately 29 years of age.23 The parameters of the baseline
model are chosen to have an optimal number of years spent on the labor market of
about 7.4 years, because an average age, when entering the labor market of 21.6 seems
reasonable.24 T , the total number of years spent on the labor market is assumed to
be 40. The age at retirement is thus 61.6. The parameters α1 and α2 are 5% and 2%,
reflecting the observation that income increases with experience more during phase
1 when no children are present and less when she works part-time and looks after
her children (phase 2). Empirically one does not observe an increase of real income
during phase 3, hence we set α3 = 0. We start at an exogenously given wage of 10. It
endogenously increases to 13.7 until t∗2, furthermore goes up to 14.1 during phase 2 and
remains at this level until T . Comparative static results are summarized in table 2.2.
To save space we left out how other variables such as labor experience and the wage
rate are aﬀected through a parameter change. Bold (italic) values represent increasing
(decreasing) t∗2’s or k∗’s due to a 1% increasing parameter.
22We use Matlab to find numerical solutions for the eight conditions; the command “fsolve” finds
solutions for nonlinear systems.
23Eurostat (2006): Population statistics
24Within the EU-15 countries over 40% of the cohort aged 22 years has entered the labour force.
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Values of the baseline model
t∗2 7.447 L∗t2 74.200 w(t
∗
2) 13.710
k∗ 2.189 L∗t3 95.806 w(t
∗
3) 14.142
LT 345.583 w(T ) 14.142
How a 1% increase of the parameters below aﬀects t∗2 and k∗
Variables wt1 = 10 α1 = 5% α2 = 2% t1 = 0 (+0.1) T = 40
t∗2 7.5035 7.7503 7.4299 7.4192 7.6150
k∗ 2.1604 2.1147 2.1901 2.2030 2.1829
c1 = 4 c2 = 50 c3 = 70 c4 = 70 c5 = 5
t∗2 7.5908 7.5228 7.3385 7.1978 7.4841
k∗ 2.1307 2.1742 2.2309 2.2565 2.1521
c6 = 20 β1 = 5% β2 = 2 β3 = 3% β4 = 3%
t∗2 7.474 7.5896 7.0766 7.1819 7.5548
k∗ 2.1307 2.133 2.2636 2.2854 2.1392
β5 = 5% Ψ = 10
t∗2 7.4619 8.0552
k∗ 2.1831 2.0429
Table 2.2: How the optimal number of children and the timing is aﬀected by the
underlying parameters.
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Changing one of the underlying parameters aﬀects all optimality conditions. A first
observation is that when k∗ increases (decreases) due to a change of one parameter,
then the timing of childbirth t∗2 decreases (increases). Besides the negative correla-
tion between these variables, there is a negative correlation between k∗ and all other
variables; the optimal number of children increases only, when the optimal cumulative
labor supplies and incomes at the end of all phases decrease. We interpret the results
one for one and concentrate on the timing of childbirth and the number of children.
An increase in the income level decreases the number of children wanted. The op-
portunity costs of having children increases, thus less children are born. An increase
in α1 delays the optimal timing of childbirth, because an individual wants to exploit
income increases during phase 1, which are larger than in any other phase. A delayed
timing of childbirth is automatically connected to fewer children. An increase in α2 on
the other hand increases the number of children wanted, because an early childbirth
is not as expensive, when her wage can still increase suﬃciently after t∗2. In an earlier
version, we accounted for α3 > 0; labor experience gained during phase 3 increases the
future income. Increasing α3 has the same comparative eﬀects on the choice variables
as increasing α2 with the same intuition behind it. Kreyenfeld (2003) examines the
diﬀerence of fertility rates between East and West Germany after the reunification in
1990. She shows that the East German cohort of young people has its first child at a
younger age compared to the West German cohort, even though it has fewer children
in total. Kreyenfeld (2003) claims that the increase in uncertainty about future income
was the main cause for this observation. Another reason seems compelling; many young
East Germans, who worked in areas for which labor experience mattered, moved to
West Germany after the re-unification, leaving those behind, whose opportunity costs
of having children early were low.
An increasing working-span of an individual (changes in t1, T andΨ) has a negative
eﬀect on fertility. An increase of the working life raises life-time income and income
per period. Thus the opportunity costs of having children are larger. An increase
of c1 or β1 means that the marginal time cost of an additional child increases. Not
surprisingly, if these costs increase, the number of children goes down. Governments
that oﬀer placements in kindergartens, where children can stay until the afternoon,
give the mother the opportunity to take a longer part-time job and hence decrease c1.
c2 and β2 are parameters that are connected to the time cost burden of raising children,
when children come late. Up to a number of
√
c2 years, the time costs reflected by
the second term of c(k, t2) are less than one. Since they increase exponentially though,
they do matter at some point and induce her to enter phase 2. When c2 increases or β2
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decreases, the marginal time cost of giving birth late decreases. Therefore women have
fewer children but later. Medical research enabling late childbirth has a negative eﬀect
on fertility. Soares (2005) shows why advances in medical research corresponds with
lower fertility in developing countries. When child mortality is reduced, the expected
costs of large families increase and the marginal benefits decrease. An increase of
benefits from young and old children c3, c4 and β3 increase the number of children. If
the length of phase 2 is long (large c5 and β4), then the individual’s number of children
decreases. The results come from the underlying structure of the model based on costs
mainly occurring due to leaving phase 1 and entering phase 2 (decrease of cumulative
experience return), but benefits also occur during the last phase. A government that
oﬀers suﬃcient placements of full-day care centres or full-time schools increases its
country’s fertility, by shortening phase 2. β5 and c6 are connected to the monetary costs
she has to encounter, when children are young. An increase of child benefits increases
the number of children. It is straightforward to include monetary costs for phase 3 as
well. Changing the parameters of these, when they have the same functional form as
m(k, t2) also has the same eﬀect as changing β5 and c6. Child benefits are reflected by a
lower c6. A financial incentive given to parents in Germany is the so-called “Elterngeld”
(parental benefits). Parents receive up to 2/3 of one of the partner’s last net income
for one year, if one parent stays at home during that time and looks after the child.
Parents can choose between a one-year-parental-leave and a day-care centre. In our
model this would be reflected by the choice between a positive c6 and a lower c(k, t2)
if the parental leave is rejected and a negative c6 and a very large c(k, t2) such that
l∗2 = 0 if it is accepted. Apps and Rees (2004) also show how specific government
policies aﬀect fertility choices.
2.3 Extension A: Divorce
Marriage may not last until the end of a woman’s planning horizon T . 25 When
the probability of divorce increases through an exogenous change, then Grossbard-
Shechtman (1984) argues that women have more outside options and reduce their
supply of household goods which includes the number of children. In our setup divorce
causes the number of children to be reduced as well, but for a diﬀerent reason. Di-
vorce is more costly for a woman when she has more children. A woman with many
25Sweden and the United Kingdom have the highest divorce rates in Europe with over 50%. Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway and Switzerland
have divorce rates between 40%-50%. Ireland, Italy, Poland and Spain have the lowest divorce rates
of less than 20% according to Eurostat (2006) "Population Statistics".
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children has less labor experience and hence a lower income. At the same time the
costs of having children increase after divorce, because she has to raise them by herself
cd(k, t2) > c(k, t2) and receives less monetary support from the father, hence her mone-
tary contribution to children increases md(k, t2) > m(k, t2). Benefits from children for
the mother do not change after divorce. A divorce solely eﬀects the woman’s utility,
when it occurs during phase 2, therefore we also restrict it to that phase.
Phase 2 t ∈ [t2, t3] is solved in two steps
1. The date of divorce d is known and d ∈ [t2, t3]
2. The date of divorce is uncertain.
2.3.1 Step 1: The Optimal Plan before and after Divorce
known to occur at time d.
Optimal Plan after d We begin to solve the problem by finding the individual’s
optimal plan after divorce has occurred. Later it is shown, how the individual acts
before the known date d. The objective that needs to be maximized is
V d2 =
R t3
d
©
x2(t) + ln
£
Ψ− l2(t)− cd(k, t2)
¤
+ v2(k)
ª
dt + V ∗3 subject to the budget
constraint w(Lt)l2(t) = x2(t) + md(k, t2) and as before
·
Lt = l2(t). The Lagrangian
after divorce is
Γd2 [x2(t), l2(t)] = x2(t) + ln
£
Ψ− l2(t)− cd(k, t2)
¤
+ v2(k) (2.33)
+η2(t)l2(t) + λ2(t)
£
w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−md(k, t2)
¤
Substituting λ2(t) = 1 the equilibrium conditions of this problem are
ld2(t) = Ψ− cd(k, t2)−
1
η2(t) + w(Lt)
(2.34)
·
η2(t) = −
·
w(Lt) (2.35)
The transversality condition here is an expression of the costate at t3. Working an
additional hour at t3 increases her income and has a future return of
ηd2(t3) =
∂w(Lt)
∂Lt
|t=t3
Z T
t3
LTdt =
∂w(Lt)
∂Lt
|t=t3 [LT − Lt3] (2.36)
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Given transversality condition (2.36), equation (2.35) can be re-written such that the
costate becomes
ηd2(t) = w(Lt3)− w(Lt) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ] (2.37)
where α2(t3) =
∂w3(Lt)
∂Lt
|t=t3.
Using (2.34) and (2.37) we solve for the optimal labor supply, which is independent
of time and its consumption counterpart, which does depend on time just as in the
absence of divorce,
ld2 = Ψ− cd(k, t2)−
1
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3]
(2.38)
xd2(t) = Ψw(Lt)− cd(k, t2)w(Lt)−
w(Lt)
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ]
−md(k, t2) (2.39)
The direct utility after divorce V d2 (d), which is needed to find the optimal number of
children later is
V d2 (d) =
Z t3
d
©
xd2(t) + ln
£
Ψ− ld2 − cd(k, t2)
¤
+ v2(k)
ª
dt+ V ∗3 (2.40)
and the per-period direct utility, needed for the same reason, is
V d2 (t) =
Ψw(Lt)− cd(k, t2)w(Lt)− w(Lt)w(Lt3 )+α2(t3)[LT−Lt3 ] −m
d(k, t2)
+ ln
∙
1
w(Lt3 )+α2(t3)[LT−Lt3]
¸
+ v2(k)
(2.41)
Optimal Plan before d We solve for an optimal plan for a known date of divorce d.
The individual maximizes the objective
R d
t2
{x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)} dt
subject to the constraint w(Lt)l2(t) = x2(t) +m(k, t2).
·
η2(t) = −
·
w(Lt) (2.42)
together with the transversality condition
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η2(d) = α2(d)
Z T
d
l(t)dt (2.43)
yields the costate’s functional equation
η2(t) = w(L(d))− w(Lt) + α2(d) [LT − L(d)] (2.44)
Proposition 2.2 The costate function does not change after a known date of divorce,
when the experience derivative of income is time independent α2(t) = α2.
Proof. Substituting α2 for α2(t) in (2.37)
ηd2(t) = w(Lt3)− w(Lt) + α2 [LT − Lt3]
= w(L(d)) +
Z t3
d
·
w(Lt)dt− w(Lt) + α2 [LT − Lt3]
= w(L(d)) +
Z t3
d
α2l(t)dt− w(Lt) + α2 [LT − Lt3]
= w(L(d)) + α2 [Lt3 − L(d)]− w(Lt) + α2 [LT − Lt3 ]
which is equal to (2.44).
The result here is also due to the utility’s functional form. If it were not quasi-linear
in the consumption good, then λ2(t) 6= 1 and the costate would depend on per-period
labor or consumption.
l2 = Ψ− c(k, t2)−
1
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3]
(2.45)
x2(t) = Ψw(Lt)− c(k, t2)w(Lt)−
w(Lt)
w(Lt3) + α2(t3) [LT − Lt3 ]
−m(k, t2) (2.46)
(2.46) shows that consumption is larger before than after divorce has occurred,
because c(k, t2) < cd(k, t2) and m(k, t2) < md(k, t2). l2 > ld2 because children demand
more time for their child care. Future benefits of labor remain unchanged.
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2.3.2 Step 2: The optimal plan before an unknown date of
divorce
Decisions after d are given in the last section; see (2.38) and (2.39). They do not vary,
when divorce is uncertain, because after d all uncertainty is cleared. Expectations
about divorce are uniform among all representatives, the subjective probability that
divorce occurs at time t is φ(t). The perceived probability that the marriage will persist
at least until time t is consequently calculated as
G(t) =
Z t3
t
φ(t)dt (2.47)
The date of divorce is unknown; the individual is obliged to maximize her expected
utility,
Z t3
t2
φ(d)H(d)dd+
Z t3
t2
φ(d)V d2 (d)dd (2.48)
where V d2 (d) is given by (2.40) and H(d) =
R d
t2
u2 [x2(t), l2] dt =R d
t2
{x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)} dt. (2.48), upon integration by parts
may be expressed as
Z t3
t2
©
G(t)u2 [x2(t), l2] + φ(t)V d2 (t)
ª
dt (2.49)
where V d2 (t) is given by (2.41).
Therefore an individual maximizes
Z t3
t2
©
G(t)u2 [x2(t), l2] + φ(t)V d2 (t)
ª
dt+ V ∗3 (2.50)
subject to the known constraints. Consequently, the Lagrangian fromwhich the socially
optimal plan before divorce can be derived is
Γ = G(t) {x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)}+ φ(t)V d2 (Lt) (2.51)
+ηbd2 (t)l2(t) + λ2(t) [w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−m(k, t2)]
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where the equilibrium conditions are
λ2(t) = G(t) (2.52)
l2(t) = Ψ− c(k, t2)−
G(t)
ηbd(t) +G(t)w(Lt)
(2.53)
·
ηbd2 (t) = −φ(t)
∂V d2
∂Lt
−
·
w(Lt)G(t) (2.54)
where ηbd2 (t) is the costate of phase 3 before divorce, when divorce is uncertain.
The per period consumption is
x2(t) = Ψw(Lt)− c(k, t2)w(Lt)−
G(t)w(Lt)
ηbd2 (t) + λ2(t)w(Lt)
−m(k, t2) (2.55)
The expected direct utility in the presence of uncertainty (index U) at t2 for all future
periods of phase 3 is
V U2 (k, Lt) =
Z t3
t2
©
G(t)u2 [x∗2(t), l
∗
2] + φ(t)V
d
2 (Lt)
ª
dt+ V ∗3 (2.56)
The costate’s time derivatives before and after divorce in the absence of uncertainty
(2.42) and (2.35) respectively denoted by
·
η2(t) are equal. Comparing these with (2.54)
denoted by
·
ηbd2 (t) indicates the timing of childbirth, when divorce is uncertain. Both
equations are used to derive
·
η2(t) =
·
ηbd2 (t) + φ(t)
∂V d2
∂Lt
G(t)
(2.57)
The costates’ time derivative and therefore also the costates themselves are equal,
when the probability of divorce at some time t, φ(t) = 0, and the perceived probability
that marriage will persist at least until time t, G(t) = 1. The second term in the
nominator of (2.57) is small, because the instantaneous probability of divorce φ(t) is
small. G(t) is the probability that a couple is still married at time t. In most EU
countries except the UK and Sweden this value is at least 0.5 for all t ∈ [t2, t3]. Thus
one can assume that G(t) > φ(t)∂V
d
2
∂Lt
. Both time derivatives are negative, because
within this phase and any other phase, experience pays oﬀ less and less the sooner she
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Figure 2.2: The co-states of phase two, when a divorce does not occur and when it
does for a known and an unknown d.
reaches her retirement, therefore
·
ηbd2 (t) <
·
η2(t). Both costate functions have the same
functional value at t3, because all uncertainty is resolved at t3. In the case of no divorce
ηbd2 (t)must lie entirely above η2(t). They coincide at t3. In case a divorce occurs, ηbd2 (t)
must jump downwards such that both costates can coincide. This is shown in figure
2.2.
When the date of divorce is known, then the costate before and after divorce is
unchanged. It is only aﬀected, when d is unknown. This shows that our individual
values labor more, when she faces the risk of divorce. She therefore has a higher labor
supply in the presence of uncertainty. A known date of divorce would therefore lead
to a lower labor supply and more children due to the negative correlation between
these variables. Next we answer the question whether a woman reduces the number
of children in the presence of divorce and if she consequently delays the timing of
childbirth.
2.4 Extension B: Divorce, a numerical simulation
After illustrating divorce within this model setup analytically such that there is a
positive probability of divorce in every period of phase 2 (extension A), we continue to
show a simplified method where divorce occurs with a positive probability at varying
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points in time between t2 and t3. Derivations from extension A are needed in this
section. The divorce probability is zero for all other periods as in extension A, because
a woman would not be aﬀected by it in this setup. Again it’s a straightforward extension
to include divorce for phase 3, when there are monetary costs connected to children in
that phase. Our main results do not change, hence we leave it out, however we discuss
them briefly below. Within this framework, we can solve for the timing of fertility and
the number of children numerically as we have done in the baseline model. Extension A
was more general therefore less precise, because it only characterizes the costate during
phase 2 in the presence of divorce, but does not find a solution for t∗2 and k∗ explicitly,
which this section does. With a probability of p < 1 there is a divorce during phase 2.
Re-marriages are excluded for simplicity. The possible date of divorce d during phase
2 is given by
d = t2 +
h(k)
c7
(2.58)
where c7 ∈ (1,∞). (2.58) means that divorce occurs after a certain portion of
phase 2 is over, which depends on c7. The longer phase 3 the more children are
present; h0(k) > 0. Divorce occurs then later as it is more costly, when more children
are present. Next we derive the t2 and k- optimality conditions. Again we diﬀerentiate
utility streams. The first and third phases’ utilities do not change through divorce but
their utility stream needs to be added to the two cases: divorce and no-divorce. The
utility streams from t1 to T are thus;
1. No divorce: (2.23)+(2.24)+(2.25)
2. Divorce during phase 2: (2.23)+DP ∗2.1 +DP ∗2.2d+(2.25).
26
For t ∈ [t2, d], t2 and d fixed
DP ∗2.1 = max
x2(t)
Z d
t2
{x2(t) + ln [Ψ− l2(t)− c(k, t2)] + v2(k)} dt (2.59)
s.t.
·
l2(t) = l2(t) and w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−m(k, t2) = 0
For t ∈ [d, t2 + h(k)] t2, h(k) and d fixed
26The subscript 2.1 is attached to the utility during phase 2 up to d and 2.2d to the utility during
phase 2 after d.
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DP ∗2.2d = max
x2(t)
Z t2+h(k)
d
©
x2(t) + ln
£
Ψ− l2(t)− cd(k, t2)
¤
+ v2(k)
ª
dt (2.60)
s.t.
·
l2(t) = l2(t) and w(Lt)l2(t)− x2(t)−md(k, t2) = 0
Case 1, the no divorce case is described by the baseline model. The left hand side of
(2.29) multiplied by the no-divorce probability is the first part of the expected utility.
Case 2: We have already solved for DP ∗2.1 +DP ∗2.2d in extension A. The t2-optimality
conditions can be derived when adding the terms of our two cases:
1. The expected utility from "no-divorce" case for the t2-optimality condition is
given by
(1− p)
∙
H∗2 (t2)−
∂c(k, t2)
∂t2
h(k)
Ψ− l∗2 − c(k, t2)
−H∗3 (t3)
¸
(2.61)
2. The part, when divorce occurs at d during phase 3 is
p
⎧
⎨
⎩
H∗2 (t2)−Hd∗2 (t2 + h(k))− 1Ψ−l∗2−c(t2,k)∗h
h(k)
c7
∂c(k,t2)
∂t2
+ h(k)
¡
1− c−17
¢ ∂cd(k,t2)
∂t2
i ⎫⎬
⎭ (2.62)
The quotient 1Ψ−l∗2−c(t2,k) is equal after and before divorce, because the change
of the labor supply and the change of the children’s time costs c(t2, k) cancel.
For the not-divorce and for the divorce case, Hamiltonians of the same phase
evaluated at diﬀerent periods are equal such that H∗2(t2+
h(k)
c7
)−H∗2(t2) = 0 and
Hd∗2 (t2 + h(k))−Hd∗2 (t2 + h(k)c7 ) = 0.
Adding (2.61) and (2.62), and setting these terms equal to zero is the t2-optimality
condition, when divorce is a possibility within a marriage. The k-optimality condition
is derived next.
1. Case 1: the probability of no-divorce is multiplied with the LHS of equation (2.32);
(1− p)
(
h(k)
h
∂v2(k)
∂k −
∂c(k,t2)
∂k
1
Ψ−l∗2−c(k,t2)
i
+(T − t3)∂v3(k)∂k + h0(k) [H∗2(t3)−H∗3 (t3)]
)
(2.63)
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Parameter increases by 1%
Variables Baseline c7 = 2 c8 = 2 c9 = 1.5 p = 40%
Lt∗2 75.6536 75.6980 75.6994 75.7193 75.6926
Lt∗3 98.6950 98.7433 98.7523 98.7553 98.7389
LT 354.0908 354.1627 354.2116 354.1273 354.1630
wt∗2 13.7827 13.7849 13.7850 13.7860 13.7846
wt∗3 14.2435 14.2458 14.2460 14.2467 14.2456
wT 14.2435 14.2458 14.2460 14.2467 14.2456
t∗2 7.5928 7.5972 7.5974 7.5994 7.5967
k∗ 1.7887 1.7850 1.7828 1.7865 1.7851
Table 2.3: The eﬀect of divorce related parameters on the variables of the model
2. Case 2: divorce at d:
p
(
h(k)
h
∂v2(k)
∂k −
∂c(k,t2)
∂k
1
Ψ−l∗2−c(k,t2)
i
+ (T − t3)∂v3(k)∂k
+h
0(k)
c7
£
H∗2(d)−Hd∗2 (d)
¤
+ h0(k)
£
Hd∗2 (t3)−Hd∗3 (t3)
¤ ) (2.64)
The first two terms are the same as in case 1. The length of phase 2 increases with
k by h0(k), also remember that d is positively dependent on h(k). When divorce
occurs at d, then the first part of phase 2 [t2, d3] increases, because divorce occurs
later (term 3). At the same time phase 2 becomes longer and phase 3 becomes
shorter (term 4).
Setting the sum of (2.63) and (2.64) equal to zero, is the k- optimality condition
in the presence of divorce. We can continue with the numerical simulation to
find k∗ and t∗2. We assume that a woman’s time cost, which occur during phase
2, when raising children increase to c8c(k, t2) after she had a divorce. Monetary
costs during phase 2 change to c9m(k, t2). The parameters c8 and c9 must all be
larger than one. Values of newly introduced parameters, where p is the divorce
probability and c7 the timing when divorce occurs within this phase are given in
the second line of table 2.3. The probability of divorce is assumed to be 40%.
Divorce occurs half way through within each phase, time costs are doubled and
monetary costs increase by one half. All other parameters are the same as in the
baseline model. The results for divorce are summarized by table 2.3.
The number of children in the presence of divorce decreases to k∗ = 1.79 from
around 2.2 in the baseline model, where divorce was excluded from the analysis. k∗ =
1.79 is closer to the average of the number of children a woman within the European
Union countries gave birth to in 2007. In 2007 the fertility rate within the 27 European
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member states was between 1.25 (Slovakia) and 1.98 (France).27 Not surprisingly, an
increase of all divorce related parameters delays childbirth and yields a decrease of
the optimal number of children. The burden of divorce is largest when children are
young. We extended this present model to allow for divorce during phase 3; children
would not need to be looked after, however they still receive a monetary transfer from
their parents: c3(k, t2) = 0 and m3(k, t2) > 0. A change of the divorce probability of
phase 3 aﬀects fertility less than a change of the divorce probability of phase 2, because
costs are larger during phase 2, when time is devoted to raising children c8. If divorce
occurs with certainty, then fertility decreases to 1.38 in this setting. One can further
show that the second derivative of the fertility rate as a function of the divorce rate
is positive. Our results are in line with empirical observations. Bedard and Deschenes
(2003) use data from the 1980 U.S. Census Public-Use Micro Samples and show that
the ever-divorced women have higher wages, which are reflected by increased labor
supply intensities. In table 2.3, cumulative labor supplies or experience levels Lt2 , Lt3
and LT and corresponding wage levels are larger when the divorce probability increases
marginally. Our results still hold, when p would increase to 100%.
2.5 Conclusions
This model has been the first to solve simultaneously for the optimal timing of child-
birth and number of children in a continuous time framework, where the wage is de-
termined by work experience in a way that depends on the life phase in which it is
accumulated. It shows that the date of childbirth and the number of children are neg-
atively related. The marginal value of labor jumps when labor experience influences
income diﬀerently, which is most likely to be the case when one changes from a full-time
to a part-time job. A steep income profile right after leaving school has a negative eﬀect
on fertility, while a steep income profile when raising children and afterwards aﬀects
fertility positively.
We have shown the eﬀects of the diﬀerent types of cost of raising children, time
costs and money costs. Individuals with high returns from education spend more time
in education and have fewer children. Women value market work more when they face
the risk of divorce, and so fertility is delayed and fewer children are born. The largest
impact of divorce is when the probability of divorce during the phase in which the
children are at home is large. Then a woman has to bear larger monetary costs, but
27European Commission, Eurostat: Statistics in focus 81/2008, Population and social conditions.
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even more importantly she has to devote more of her time towards child care. This has
two negative eﬀects: her current and future income decrease, because she is forced to
work less on the labor market. Overall, the results of our model appear to be consistent
with what empirical evidence is available on these relationships.
Chapter 3
Derivatives and Default Risk in the
Electricity Market
3.1 Introduction
Motivation
The European Commission and the USA want to regulate the oﬀ-market trade of
derivatives that covers 592,000 billion US-$. This reform is one of the largest tasks
for governments and regulators to come. After the insurance company American In-
ternational Group (AIG) had to be backed up by the US government, due to its risky
bets with derivatives in September 2008, the USA and Europe have been working on
stricter regulations. Fundamental elements of the reform are Central Counter Parties
(CCPs) that take over the risk in case of liquidity shortages. According to EU and US
regulatory suggestions, standardized derivative contracts need to go through CCPs.
Derivatives of this kind are often used by energy producers. Thus, it is not surprising
that Eon, one of Europe’s largest electricity and gas suppliers claims that it needs
an additional 7.5 billion US$ in capital, when the CCP requirements are enforced.
(Financial Times, 7/10/ 2009).
This paper is a first attempt to evaluate defaults and forwards in the presence of
an upstream oligopoly and downstream firms, operating in a competitive environment.
In addition to potential government bailouts, the model shows that welfare decreases
for another reason: the threat of market exit through insolvency aﬀects the market
equilibrium in itself. If an upstream oligopolist has sold forwards to a downstream firm,
and the spot price has unexpectedly fallen, then the downstream firm might not be able
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to discharge its payment obligations to the oligopolist. An oligopolist reduces this risk
by increasing the spot price, which has an immediate negative eﬀect on customers. This
model is applied to the electricity sector, and uses parameters that are based on historic
data from England and Wales. It is based on regional electricity companies (RECs)
that purchase electricity from oligopolistic generators. Before liberalization took place,
RECs had local monopolies to supply residential customers. The interaction between
producers and RECs takes place on a contract and spot market.
Literature
The market environment of this model can be well framed into a branch of the
industrial organization literature that was initiated by Allaz and Villa (1993) [AV],
and is summarized in the following. AV’s influential article shows that the presence of
a contract market increases welfare, because the competition among firms is intensified.
It creates a prisoner’s dilemma, in which firms voluntarily sell forward some of their
production on the contract market. Once they have engaged on the contract market,
they find it profitable to extend production on the spot market; the marginal revenue
increases with the amount that has been contracted before. Sustaining from contracting
is a dominated strategy, because the other firm could increase its profits by writing
contracts alone, to then become the Stackelberg leader of the game.
Mahenc and Salanié (2004) [MS] challenge the view that contract markets increase
welfare. If risk neutral producers are allowed to buy their own quantity on the contract
market, then it is a dominant strategy to do so in order to increase prices on the spot
market. The intuition here is that producers want to increase their profits on the
contract market, by increasing the spot price. In AV, producers compete in quantities
on the contract and spot market, but in MS, producers compete in quantities on the
future market and prices on the spot market. It is a necessary assumption that the
spot market is modeled as a diﬀerentiated goods Bertrand model to ensure the strategic
complementarity of prices. Another well-knownmethod to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma
is to increase the time horizon, either to infinity or to a finite number of periods, where
firms use trigger strategies. This has been done by Liski and Montero (2006) [LM], who
extend the two-stage model of AV and MS to a multiple period game with Bertrand
and Cournot competition. Contracts are traded first, the corresponding spot market
takes place one period later. In their model firms can use a trigger strategy to sustain
collusion: they have to charge the monopoly price on both markets, or the price is
otherwise set equal to marginal costs for all subsequent periods. Contract markets help
to sustain collusion, because the spot market share decreases. Furthermore firms sell
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more forward, when they compete in prices, and less, when they compete in quantities
to stay on the collusion path. Le Coq (2004) exhibits similar results under a diﬀerent
setting. Firms trade on the future market once. Quantities are delivered at multiple
subsequent spot markets.
Newbery (1998) introduces contracts in a supply function model, which is more
suitable to picture the electricity market. He shows that contracts that drive down
the expected spot price, reduce the incentive for competitors to enter the market.
Entry can thus be deterred, if incumbents hold suﬃcient capacity; a conception first
illustrated by Dixit (1980). Murphy and Smeers (2005) [MS] introduce investment
decisions in the two-markets setup. They prove that the equilibrium of a model with,
and without a contract market is the same, when players have to choose capacities
before they produce. The intuition behind the result is the same as in the Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) model; firms choose low capacities to avoid destructive competition
and restore the Cournot equilibrium. Bushnell (2007) extends AV’s model to n firms
that face increasing marginal costs. He demonstrates, how the equilibrium changes,
when an additional firm enters the market in the presence of a contract market, as
opposed to the change in the absence of a contract market. Grimm and Zoettl (2006)
[GZ] establish that a contract market decreases investment capacity in a time-varying
demand model. Capacity choices decrease the positive competition eﬀect of contract
markets. Firms choose lower capacities to avoid competition, but when demand is
low and capacity is not a binding constraint, then contracts do increase competition.
Only when demand is certain and capacity binds, then contracts do not aﬀect the
eﬃciency outcome. The model of MS shows that capacity investment decisions under
perfect foresight yield the same market outcome with and without a contract market.
Newbery (2008) studies the eﬀect of mergers in the presence of a contract market. He
demonstrates that market power increases more after a merger, when a contract market
is present. Furthermore he proves that contracts reduce capacity, which is consistent
with GZ. They also increase the fraction of time that capacity is constrained, but still
lower the time-weighted average price. The later finding shows that future markets
increase at least consumer rents, in the presence of capacity investments, and come
therefore closest to a positive contract market welfare analysis, even in the presence of
capacity constraints.
GZ and Newbery (1998) are the only papers that reasonably allude, future markets
could possible be welfare decreasing, because producers scale down their installed ca-
pacity. All other model that claim, forwards are welfare decreasing, rest on very strict
assumptions: diﬀerentiated goods, perfect information and collusion (LM) or allowing
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producers to buy forward (MS). However these assumptions can be counteracted by a
regulator, if they prove to be realistic. In line with the majority of articles, forwards
reduce the spot price in this essay, however, the eﬃciency gain is lower, when buyers
face an insolvency risk for low spot prices. The models examined so far, assume "no-
arbitrage profits" from futures. They model the upstream market and assume that
buyers accept any forward price, as long as it is not below the expected spot price. In
equilibrium, the forward price equals the spot price, an assumption that often does not
hold empirically.28 This essay models both market participants, and allows the forward
price to be diﬀerent from the spot price.
The electricity sector
Few papers have studied the impact of retail competition on contracts. Exceptions
are Powell (1993) and Green (2004), on which this model is closely based. Powell shows
that there are more forwards sold, when producers coordinate on the forward and spot
market, as opposed to a market, where producers exclusively coordinate on the forward
market. Green finds that the number of contracts sold is higher in an industry, where
an incumbent does not face any competition (in the presence of yardstick regulation) as
compared to an incumbent that is faced by a competitive fringe, which always charges
the spot price (in the presence of switching costs).
After the electricity sector has been liberalized, incumbent retailers have faced fierce
competition as opposed to producers, which have remained in an oligopoly position. A
famous retail bankruptcy example for the British market is the failure of ’Independent
Energy’ that collapsed in 2000. Thus, RECs have become vulnerable to the risk of
spot prices that have fallen below the expected level at the time, when contracts were
written. If they charge a retail price that exceeds the spot price substantially, then some
of their clients leave their previous electricity supplier to be supplied by a competitive
fringe, which buys and re-sells electricity for the current spot price. Green takes account
of the market reforms and calibrates his model with historic data from the English/
Welsh electricity sector in the 1990s that this model utilizes.
In the course of the 1990 electricity market liberalization of the UK, the RECs were
privatized. They became either public limited companies (plc) or they were bought
by large domestic producers (e.g. Powergen and Scottish Power) and foreign firms
(e.g. Eon and EDF). According to the Utilities Act in 2000, all former RECs had
to separate their supply and distribution businesses. The forwards studied here, are
"over-the-counter" (OTC) contracts that exclusively concern the supply business part,
28One of the first empirical essays on this issue is Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983).
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which supplies management services, such as billing, customer service, metering, debt
collection and administration. There is not much capital bound in the newly formed
retailer’s business, a miscalculation of past forward purchases can easily destabilize the
financial condition and force a retailer to exit the market.
Objectives
This model does not reconstruct bankruptcy probabilities for the electricity market
in England andWales, it uses the noise that was generated by its liberalization to justify
the assumption that the spot market alone is aﬀected by the threat of insolvency. Before
the liberalization, incumbent retailers held monopoly positions and bankruptcies were
highly unlikely. The forward market, described in this model, has a very long time
horizon, such that the liberalization was not anticipated, when the contract market
opened. I study the market equilibrium, where the bankruptcy threat is anticipated,
in a diﬀerent paper (Scholz, 2009). That model uses the same assumptions as the
literature described in the beginning; retailers are modeled just implicitly and buy
any number of forwards, oﬀered by producers, but it lacks the adoptability to the
electricity market. Furthermore closed-form solutions cannot be derived, when the
default risk is endogenous. It shows that the anticipation of bankruptcy at the closure
of contracts reduces the number of contracts. This induces the negative welfare eﬀect of
the insolvency risk to be even larger. The results presented here, can thus be interpreted
as being a conservative estimation.
Furthermore this model compares welfare eﬀects between forwards and options. It
demonstrates that options yield a slightly lower welfare, but are easily the preferred
instrument in the presence of bankruptcy. It is the first model that allows a welfare
analysis, in which forwards are compared to options, whose strike price is endogenous.
The model of this essay has two parts; the first part (section 3.2) studies the impact
of bankruptcy in the presence of a forward market. The second part (section 3.3)
compares the market equilibrium in the presence of forwards, with the one in the
presence of options. Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Forwards
3.2.1 Pre-liberalization period
There is an upstream market with producers, who sell forwards to incumbent regional
electricity companies. Producers set the price on the forward market and the quantities
on the spot market.29 RECs decide, how many forwards they want to buy.
Producers cooperate on the forward market, but do not coordinate on the spot
market. If there was no coordination among producers on the forward market, the
price would equal marginal costs, which is unrealistic for the electricity market. If there
was coordination on the forward and spot market, such that the total spot quantity is
the monopoly quantity, then the number of contracts increases compared to a market,
where coordination is restricted to the forward market.30 When a REC has paid a
high forward price pf , and the spot price is unexpectedly low, then the REC makes
a loss. The more contracts have been traded in the past, the larger the loss and the
bankruptcy probability; a positive correlation of these two variables is assumed. Thus
if producers cooperate on the spot market, retailers would have bought more contracts,
and the default probability would be even larger. The results presented here, can then
again be interpreted, as being a conservative estimation.
Production sector
Producers maximize their expected profits EπP , while RECs maximize a mean-variance
utility function of their profit πR. There are two symmetric producers and RECs, such
that in equilibrium the production quantity of producer i equals that of producer j
and the number of forwards sold to each REC is equal. Call fi(fj) the number of
forwards sold by producer i (j) and purchased by REC i (j).31 The game is solved
by backward induction. When producers set their spot market quantities, they do so
given the number of forwards f sold. Producers maximize their profits. Producer i0s
objective is
29Unitil 1995, the generation duopoly in the UK, even though it held less than 50% of generation
capacity, set the price 90% of the time, see Wolfram (1999). Section 3.2.2 explores this issue in greater
depth.
30The proofs are given in Powell (1993) on p. 449-450.
31In Germany RECs (“Stadtwerke”) often still buy all electricity exclusively from one generator,
even though they are not owned by it anymore.
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max
qi
πP = (p− c)qi − fi(p− pf) (3.1)
where qi is the spot quantity of producer i, c is marginal cost and pf is the forward
price. The first part of (3.1) is the spot market profit, and the second the contract
market profit. The linear inverse residual demand function with an intercept A and
slope −b can be expressed as
p = A− bqi − bqj +  (3.2)
where  ∼ N(0, σ2). All customers that do not pay the retail price are described by the
term "residual"; in particular large industrial customers, who can buy electricity from
the production sector directly. It is straightforward to solve (3.1) for the expected spot
quantity of producer i;
Eqi =
A− c+ 2bfi − bfj
3b
. (3.3)
As producers are symmetric, the expected spot price is
Ep =
A+ 2c− bfi − bfj
3
(3.4)
As mentioned before, producers set the forward price and maximize their objective
accordingly.
max
pf
EπP = (Ep− c)Eq − f(Ep− pf) + Cov(p, q) (3.5)
Cov(p, q) is the constant covariance of the spot price and quantity. The first order
condition of (3.5) can be solved for pf
pf = Ep+
µ
∂fi
∂pf
¶−1 ∙
−fi − (Eqi − fi)
∂Ep
∂pf
− (Ep− c)∂Eqi
∂pf
¸
(3.6)
Powell (1993) shows that the forward price is larger than the expected spot price.
The capacity literature can be viewed parallel to this observation; in order to miti-
gate the negative eﬀect of forwards on their market power, producers charge a higher
price than Ep, whereas in the capacity literature, incumbents might have an incentive
to over-invest in capacity as a strategic device; see Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) and
Newbery (1998) as a more recent application to the electricity market. In order to find
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∂f
∂pf , RECs are modeled that choose the optimal number of contracts, given the forward
price that is oﬀered by the production sector.
Retail sector
A fix number of customers served by an incumbent REC, V purchases electricity for a
regulated price r before the market was reformed.
The two RECs that have been characterized by subindexes i and j in the last
section, operate in separate markets but are symmetric. In reality there were 12, and
not two heterogeneous risk averse RECs in England and Wales; cooperation would
thus have been very diﬃcult to implement, and is not assumed in this model. A REC
maximizes a mean-variance function applied to its profit as in Powell (1993),
Ui = E(πRi )−
1
2
λV ar(πRi ) (3.7)
where the expected profit is
E(πRi ) = V [r −E(p)] + fi[E(p)− pf ] (3.8)
The variance is V ar(πR) = V ar[V (r− p)+ fi(p− pf)] = V ar[p(fi−V )] = (V − fi)2σ2,
where the only variable part is the price. RECs choose the optimal number of contracts,
they purchase. REC i0s objective is max
fi
Ui = E(πRi )− 12λV ar(πRi ), which is solved for
fi
fi = V +
E(p)− pf
λσ2 − [∂E(p)/∂fi]
(3.9)
(3.4) is used to manipulate (3.9), in order to derive REC i0s demand for contracts as a
function of the number of contracts bought by the other REC.
fi(fj) =
V (b+ 3λσ2) +A+ 2c− bfj − 3pf
2b+ 3λσ2
(3.10)
Due to symmetry, fi(fj) and fj(fi) solve for REC’s demand function of contracts, given
the forward price:
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f(pf) =
V (b+ 3λσ2) +A+ 2c− 3pf
3(b+ λσ2)
(3.11)
Equation (3.6) and (3.11) can be solved for the optimal number of forwards, f∗i =
f∗j = f∗, based on the underlying parameters. The derivatives in (3.6) can easily be
derived, using (3.3), (3.4) and (3.11).
f∗ =
V ( b
3
+ λσ2)− 1
9
(A− c)
10
9
b+ 2λσ2
(3.12)
Furthermore the first order condition of pf , (3.6) is solved with (3.3), (3.4), (3.11)
and (3.12) to express pf based on the expected spot price and the number of contracts
signed
pf = Ep+
1
9
(A− c) + f∗(7
9
b+ λσ2) (3.13)
This shows that the forward price exceeds the level of the expected spot price.
The diﬀerence increases with the risk aversion parameter. Even for λ = 0, the forward
price exceeds the expected price, because contracts decrease future spot prices (see also
Powell, 1993). The demand for contracts decreases with the number of contracts the
other REC purchases, (3.10), which is a justified result, as RECs were of considerable
size. The larger the demand elasticity, the more RECs hedge, because the negative
impact on the spot price per forward contract, increases with b. (see (3.4)) Another
reason for price divergence is the large percentage of OTC trade in the electricity sector,
which implicates non-transparent pricing.32
3.2.2 Post liberalization period
Since the market was reformed, residential customers have been able to choose their
electricity supplier. If a customer chooses to find a new supplier in this model, then she
would receive her electricity from the competitive fringe. Costumers are assumed to
face switching costs, such that some are willing to remain with their regional electricity
company and pay a higher price.
The market share of the incumbent retailer decreases, when the retail price, which
32In Germany for instance the liberalization of the electricity market has not yet reached the same
level as in the UK, because RECs (“Stadtwerke”) still hold both: distribution and supply. Over 80%
of electricity is sold through bilateral contracts, most with a single incumbent generator based on
historical ties. Due to commercial confidentiality, neither price nor quality information are revealed.
(WIK, 2008)
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is assumed not to be regulated after liberalization, is above the current spot price.
Green’s (2004) simple demand expression that an incumbent retailer faces, after a
competitive fringe has entered the market, is also useful for this work
V NEW = V − h(r − p) (3.14)
A high constant parameter h is interpreted by low switching costs. When switching
costs are low, the incumbent’s market share decreases more for (r − p) > 0.
Retail sector
The former RECs are allowed to choose the retail price r, which has been dictated by
a regulator before the liberalization. Thus the new retail objective becomes
max
r
πR = V NEW (r − p) + f(p− pf) (3.15)
The optimal new retail price is
r∗ = p+
V
2h
(3.16)
There is no expectation operator in (3.15), because retailers know the realization of
, when they choose r∗. In the past, forward contracts were written to protect RECs
from volatile pool prices, because they had to sell into a regulated market with a for-
merly fix retail price. After the liberalization, this alleged protection has jeopardized
retailers that now have to act in a volatile retail price environment. Meanwhile the
market has become more competitive and retailers have to carry the burden of con-
tracts. This model assumes that there is a positive probability of bankruptcy, when
a retailer incurs a loss based on the contract of diﬀerences. The return of forwards
is negative, when the spot price is below the forward price, otherwise contracts yield
positive returns. If p < pf the situation worsens with low switching costs (large h),
because in that case, retailers can just charge a low mark-up, see (3.16). The bank-
ruptcy probability consists of an exogenous part s, which contains information about
its ownership structure, how likely the retailer is able to raise loans from banks, and
how much savings it holds. Incumbent retailers might also be bailed out by their own-
ers, when these are able to raise suﬃcient funds. Owners are generally less willing to
vouch for the retailers, when the loss −πR is very large, which is incorporated in the
bankruptcy probability. But there are also diﬀerent warrantors as such; public entities
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are generally more willing to burn (taxpayer’s) money than private entities, to preserve
trust. In the English/ Welsh market all RECs were bought by private companies, some
of them very large and operating worldwide, thus they would be reluctant not to act as
a guarantor for their retailer, registered as public limited company, to maintain their
reputation. The diﬀerent owner types are expressed by the exogenous multiplier s.
Thus the default probability is defined as
α = α(sπR) =
0 if πR > 0
−sπR if πR < 0
(3.17)
The survival probability is denoted by η(πR) = 1− α(πR). If a retailer has a low s
then it is owned by an entity that is more likely to guarantee for its retailer’s payments,
when πR < 0. If πR is positive, then the bankruptcy threat is absent, α = 0 and η = 1.
If bankruptcy occurs or not, is irrelevant in this model; it is the risk that aﬀects the
spot market equilibrium.
Production sector
The retailer’s ownership structure is known in the UK, hence s can be estimated.
Furthermore the number of contracts can be assessed, based on the market that the
former REC operated, allowing the probability of default to be derived. Producers
maximize their expected profit by choosing an optimal production quantity, where
the expectation is based on, how likely it is that the retailer manages to transfer
pf − p, for the contracts signed. There is no uncertainty about the demand intercept
at this stage. If a retailer fails, contracts become worthless, but producers still sell
an unconstraint quantity on the spot market. The residual demand is not aﬀected
by bankruptcy, because there are other generators that can absorb customers from
bankrupt, incumbent retailers. The generation capacity of the duopoly, which covered
73% of total capacity in 1990-91 decreased to 46% in 1995-96 and an estimated 38%
in 2000-01 (Monopolies and Merger Commission, 1996). But until 1995, the duopoly
set the pool’s electricity price 90% of the time, which justifies this model’s assumption
that the duopoly sets a quantity that reflects the market price.33
max
qi
EπPi = pqi − cqi − fi(p− pf)ηi(πRi ) (3.18)
33For background information see Wolfram (1999) and Newbery (1995, 1998).
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To find the spot quantity of (3.18), a function is maximized that depends on the
optimal outcome, as πR(q) is a function of q = (qi, qj). The optimal value of q is
found by solving two separate maximization problems with η(πR) < 1 and η(πR) = 1
respectively, because η(πR) is not continuous. Define πP,B(qB) to be the producer’s
objective, when η(πR) < 1 and πP,NB(qNB) the objective, when η(πR) = 1.34 qB∗ and
qNB∗ are the corresponding optimal values, which are compared in the four diﬀerent
equilibria, possible;
1. qmax = qB∗ if EπP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗) and EπR(qB∗) < 0.35
2. qmax = qNB∗ if πP,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗) and EπR(qB∗) > 0.
3. πP,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗) and πR(qNB∗) < 0: when this outcome occurs, pro-
ducers prefer that retailers have a zero probability to go bust. If πP,NB(qNB∗) +
πR,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗)+EπR,B(qB∗), producers and retailers might consider
to either merge or renegotiate their contracts.
4. EπP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗) and πR(qB∗) > 0: In this case producers rather maxi-
mize the objective when their retailers could possibly default. Producers produce
qmax = qNB as they cannot force retailers to go bankrupt, when πR(qB∗) > 0.
Furthermore computing EπP,B(qB∗) does not make sense, because one would as-
sume that η > 1. Thus this equilibrium is not realistic.
For a retailer’s survival probability of η(πR) < 1
First, the optimal spot market quantity is solved, which is set by producers. When
an incumbent retailer goes bust, then the producer does not receive the forward price
for the contract coverage, but sells to customers directly or through the competitive
fringe. A retailer is threatened by a loss when p¿ pf , where the price diﬀerence has to
be suﬃcient, because retailers realize a profit from those customers who do not switch,
and pay a retail price above the spot price, see (3.16). After the bankruptcy of a
retailer, whom a producer has written contracts with, the positive transfer of f(p−pf)
would not be obtained. Thus producers minimize the default risk, by keeping the spot
price up. (3.15) and (3.17) are converted, to rewrite the producer’s profit as a function
of the retailer loss
34Throughout the rest of this chapter, the superscript B stands for, "there exists a bankruptcy
risk", and NB stands for, "there exists no bankruptcy risk".
35The expectation operator for profits applies to the B- case only, because there is no uncertainty,
when retailers cannot possible go bankrupt.
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πP,B1 = (p− c)q1 − f1(p− pf)
©
1 + s
£
V (r∗ − p) + f1(p− pf)
¤ª
The first term is the spot market profit, the second term is the expected contract
market return. The later simple contains the survival probability, η(πR) as a multiplier.
Substituting r∗
πP,B1 = (p− c)q1 − f1(p− pf)
½
1 + s
∙
V 2
4h
+ f1(p− pf)
¸¾
The spot price p contains A∗ = A + . The demand is known at this point and
producers play the Cournot game on the spot market. At the contract market though
conjectural variations ∂fi∂fj are assumed to equal zero.
∂πP,B
∂qi
= A∗ − 2bqi − bqj − c + bfi
n
1 + sV
2
4h + sfi
£
(A∗ − bqi − bq2)− pf
¤o
+
sbf2i
£
(A∗ − bqi − bqj)− pf
¤ .
= 0
The foc can be rewritten for identical retailers and producers, fi = fj = f and qBi =
qBj = qB
qB∗ =
A∗ − c+ bf
³
1 + sV
2
4h
´
+ 2sbf2(A∗ − pf)
3b+ 4sb2f2
(3.19)
If qB∗ is realized, then the spot price is equal to
pB∗ = A∗ − 2bqB∗ =
A∗ + 2c− bf
³
2 + sV
2
2h
´
+ 4sbf2pf
3 + 4sbf2
(3.20)
(3.20) is the optimal production quantity, when bankruptcy is possible. One can
substitute (3.12), (3.16), (3.19) and (3.20) in (3.15) and (3.18) to derive πR(qB∗) and
EπP (qB∗) that only depend on the underlying parameters of the model. If πR < 0
and πP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗), then it is for generators optimal to take the risk, that
incumbent retailers are exposed to the bankruptcy threat.
For a retailer’s survival probability of η(πR) = 1
If a former REC realizes a profit, then it survives by definition and the survival prob-
ability equals one. Again, producers play the Cournot game on the spot market, while
conjectural variations at the forward market are zero. The equilibrium is described
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through (3.3) and (3.4), where A is substituted for the realized intercept A∗.
πR(qAV ∗) and πP (qAV ∗) can thus also be expressed by the model’s parameters.
When πR > 0 and πP,C(qC∗) < π(qAV ∗), generators choose a spot quantity such that
the incumbent retailer survives with certainty.
3.2.3 Results
This section presents a numerical solution of this model, based on data of the electric-
ity sector in England and Wales. In the early 1990s, there was a generation duopoly,
and there were 12 incumbents in the retail sector. The two privatized firms, National
Power and Powergen, held respectively 50% and 30% of the total generation capacity.
The Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales was reformed in 1990. Before
its restructuring took place, there had been a state-owned Central Electricity Generat-
ing Board, responsible for generation and transmission, selling to 12 state-owned Area
Electricity Boards, which were responsible for distribution. Nearly 80% of the indus-
try’s generation came from coal-fired stations, and most of the remaining electricity
from nuclear power. Green’s (2004) parameter values are applied in this model. He
assumes marginal cost c being equal to £20/ MWh. The parameters of the residual
demand curve are set to A = 50 and b = 2
3
.
The welfare analysis, which is conducted later, estimates the consumer surplus based
on "residual" demand.36 Customers that remained with the incumbent are ignored,
because this is not a general welfare analysis of the liberalization process as such. This
model rather analyzes, how bankruptcy aﬀects the market equilibrium. In the 1990s,
there were already some small generators on the market, which were price takers.
Therefore the profit and expected profit that are derived are "residuals", too.
Green sets the sales volume per REC to V=2.5 GW representing the total sales to
small customers of the 12 RECs equal to 30 GW. There are two retailers in this model;
each writes contracts with one generator, nevertheless the same volume per REC of
V=2.5 GW is adopted, as it can be shown that even with a relatively small contract
coverage, the market equilibrium is changed by the risk of default, significantly. This
makes this model’s findings even more meaningful. The switching cost parameter is
set to h = 0.15, because incumbents lost approximately one third of their market
share or 0.9 GW of sales due to a 10% retail price diﬀerence at that time, when the
retail price was around £60/MWh. Green claims that the variance of the annual
36In addition to consumer rents, welfare includes expected producer and retailer profits. Consumer
rents equal the area between the inverse demand function and the spot price.
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pool’s price, σ2 = 5.76 (from 01/1990 to 01/2000) was distinctively low, because of
high level contracting, market power and regulatory pressure. It is contrary to the
volatility in Nordic countries, which depend heavily on rainfall, due to the importance
of hydro power plants. There, the variance was equal to 34.9 between 1993 and 2003.
A volatility of somewhere in between is used; σ2 = 30. Green derives a risk aversion
parameter of λ = 0.178.37
The default probability consists of the retailer’s profit πR and the exogenous pa-
rameter s.38 In the first numerical simulation, which is summarized by figure 3.1, the
intercept is 20% below the expected value, thus  = −10. In order to analyze bank-
ruptcy, it must occur with positive probability. Accordingly, the necessary condition is
that retailers incur a loss. Instead of choosing a small , one could have lowered switch-
ing costs though increasing h. Former RECs make a small profit, when the switching
parameter is lifted from h = 0.15 to h = 0.14. Thus in the absence of the unexpected
market entry, RECs would have never had to face a loss, which justifies the assumption
that default was never contemplated, when the contracts were signed. Finally s , the
multiplier of πR for πR < 0 is chosen to arrive at the bankruptcy probability α. This
essay is not interested in finding a potential default rate of former UK RECs, however
in the question, how the market equilibrium is aﬀected, when diﬀerent s-parameters are
considered. Diﬀerent values of s are chosen that determine a reasonably bankruptcy
rate α.
In this setup, the number of forwards is not aﬀected by the default probability. It
is just the production quantity that producers can influence. The number of contracts
has already been chosen before market entry took place, when RECs made profits even
when the spot price was below the forward price. Based on the underlying parameters,
the expected price is Ep = 29.59 by (3.4) and the optimal number of contracts f∗ =
0.93, see (3.12). Thus 37% of total expected sales are bought on the forward market
for a forward price of pf = 38.35, see (3.13). One can alter the multiplier s to show,
how total welfare, producer profits, α and thus the retailer’s loss are aﬀected. When
s = 0, then qB∗ = qNB∗, because the objective (3.18) reduces to objective (3.1). When
the exogenous multiplier s of the bankruptcy probability α(πR∗) increases by some
percentage, then the default probability strictly increases by less or even decreases, as
long as b < 1. Producers lower the diﬀerence of pf and p by increasing p, (which lowers
37Green (2004) applies Grinold (1996)’s “grapes from wine” method, pp. 16-17.
38In order to derive profits and consumer surplus in monetary values one multiplies the values we
derive by 8.780 million. Prices are in MWh and based on hourly consumption, while V is an annual
capacity measured in GW. 1 GW annual capacity of electricity is equivalent to 8,780 GWh and 1
GWh=1000 MWh.
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the retailer’s loss) to scale down the probability that retailers fail. The intuition behind
this result is simple; when a retailer goes bust, producers do not receive the transfer
from contracts.
The expected producer profit increases with s as the spot price goes up. The
retailer’s expected loss is largest when s = 0 and EπR = −0.775. Retailers break
even at s ≈ 0.195, where producers have their largest profit of EπP = 79.1 up by
4.5% compared to its profit at s = 0. The bankruptcy probability reaches its peak
for intermediate values of s. Total expected welfare, consisting of consumer surplus,
producer and incumbent retail profits decreases from 291.5 to 283.1, when s increases
from zero to 0.195 (and α = 0 for the second time after s = 0) at the expense of the
residual consumer surplus that decreases when p goes up. Thus a producer prefers a less
solvent retailer, as producers are then committed to set a lower production quantity to
keep the possible loss from retailers low. This has been the realization of equilibrium 1
at each data point on the left hand side of the gray vertical line. Equilibrium 4, which
is not reasonable in reality occurs to the right of the vertical line. Next, examples for
equilibrium 3, which is realized when  is smaller, are demonstrated.
The parameters of the simulation that figure 3.2 is based on are the same as before,
except that  = −15 (upper part) and  = −25 (lower part). In the upper part of
figure 3.2, one can notice again that α is a concave function of s. Producers reduce the
spot price when they face a less solvent retailer to increase the probability that they
receive a payment when  < 0 and pf À p. Retailers benefit from increasing s, thus less
solvent retailers have a lower loss. Producers do not benefit from low retailer reserves.
πP,B(qB∗) falls with s up to a level where s = 0.12, which is equivalent to a bankruptcy
probability of 20%. The sum of expected producer and retailer profits is illustrated. It
is a convex increasing function of s. The sum decreases with s for small s and increases
once s ≈ 0.04, which corresponds to α ≈ 9%. Thus in a range of s ∈ (0, 0.04], producers
and retailers prefer to merge, as EπP,B(qB∗) +EπR(qB∗) < πP,NB(qNB∗) + πR∗(qNB∗),
which is equilibrium 3.
The lower part of figure 3.2, where  is even smaller, shows that for any α > 0 or
s > 0, the sum of the retail profit and expected producer profit is lower as when α = 0
and s = 0. Thus a merger might always be a preferable solution. It is straightforward
to derive the solution for asymmetric retailers with respect to h and s. A producer, who
has written contracts with a retailer that is less likely to be bailed out (high s), or one
that has customers that are more likely to switch (high h), is more prepared to adjust
the spot price downward. The other producer increases its production quantity, due
to the strategic substitutability. Accordingly, the profit of the producer with the more
Derivatives and Default 90
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
46
47
48
49
Parameters concerning retailers: λ=0.176, σ2=30, V=2.5 and h=0.15
as well as demand and marginal costs: A*=35, A=50, b=2/3 and c=20           
E
πP,
B*
+E
πR,
B*
 a
nd
  E
πP,
B*
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
Exogenous parameter s
Ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
 α(
πR,
B*
)
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04
10
12
14
16
18
20
Parameters: same as above except A*=25.
Exogenous parameter s
E πP
,B
* +
E πR
,B
*  
an
d 
 E
πP,
B*
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
 α(
πR,
B*
)
α (πR,B*)
EπP,B*
EπP,B*+EπR,B*
EπP ,B*
EπP ,B*+EπR,B*
α (πR,B*)
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solvent retailer, rises, while that of its competitor falls. The same holds for producers,
who wrote contracts with retailers that used to cover a larger market or were more
risk averse. These retailers purchased larger stakes in production plants and hold more
forwards; thus they are more exposed to the risk of low spot prices today.
3.3 Options
’Contracts for diﬀerences’ (CfDs) are pure financial contracts that resemble two-way
forward contracts, which have been examined in section 3.2. One-way CfDs, which are
call options are examined next. The first type has been studied by a broad literature
mentioned in the introduction, the second type only by very few authors. This model
demonstrates, how options can reduce market power, just in the same way, as two-way
contracts can. Retailers do not transfer (pf−p)f , when the spot price p is low, thus they
have the advantage that an incumbent retailer cannot be underbid by a competitive
fringe, which might enter the market after privatization takes place. When the spot
price is low, the option holder purchases its demand at the spot market, when the price
is high, the option holder pays the lower strike price ps. The cost of an option, paid
in any demand state, is po. Indeed if the spot price is lower than the strike price, the
REC looses po on each option bought. The option price is generally paid before the
spot market opens, thus illiquidity does not occur when the spot price is lower than
expected.39
In this section, a model is introduced that compares the market equilibrium with
forwards, to one with options. It is also shown, if welfare is higher in the forward
or option model. This is the first model that allows a welfare analysis between an
option and a forward market in the Allaz Vila (1993) framework, where the strike
price is endogenously determined. Vázquez et al. (2002) propose options as a long-
term security of supply mechanism. Few papers have compared welfare eﬀects between
markets that use options and those that use forwards. Exceptions are Chao/ Wilson
and Willems (both 2004). The first of the two papers proposes
“an annual auction of a specified quantity of multi-year option contracts at
each strike price in a specified range. Each contract is an option on physical
capacity since it requires the supplier to back the contract with available
39Schmidt (1997) shows that liquidation risk increases managerial incentives. If a firm would have
had a low liquidity in the past, previous payments would have increased managerial incentives. Hence
generally payments, made in the past are less harmful to a firm as they could be balanced through
managerial eﬀort in consecutive periods.
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capacity, to submit a standing bid at the ISO for the contracted quantity
at a price no higher than the strike price, and to be dispatchable for either
energy or reserve capacity.” (p.3)
Willems took the idea of using auctions and embedded this into a model that can be
compared to the AVmodel. Willems introduced an exogenous strike price and retrieved
the following results from his model: When the strike price is above the Cournot price,
options are out of money and the producers settle at the Cournot equilibrium. For strike
prices below the spot price achieved in AV, the AV price is achieved. For intermediate
strike prices, producers flood the market until the market price reaches the strike price.
The main result of Willems (2004) was that the market price is never lower in an option
market than in a forward market. This model supports this view, but shows that if a
model is extended by a possible bankruptcy threat, an option market is preferred to a
forward market from a welfare perspective.
One needs to make some changes to the setup, to be able to compare the option with
the forward market, while keeping it simple. If one continues to use an  ∼ N(0, σ2),
the spot price, strike price and the optimal number of contracts would depend on the
probability Pr(p > ps) and its derivative with respect to these variables. To avoid the
resulting complications that do not add further insight to our questions, it helps to
assume that  takes on discrete values, which act as demand shocks;  ∈ {0,H} with
probabilities φ for  = H and (1 − φ) for  = 0. Thus E = φH and V ar() = σ2 =
φ(1 − φ)H2. If the risk aversion parameter in (3.12) is set equal to zero, the optimal
number of forwards becomes: f∗ = 3V b−(A−c)
10b . Just for 3V b = A− c, f∗ = 0 otherwise
hedging still takes place; there are short hedges when 3V b > A − c and long hedges
when 3V b < A− c. Powell (1993) shows that in the absence of risk aversion and when
generators sell the monopoly quantity on the spot market; f∗ = 1
2
V > 0, which implies
that there is always short, never long hedging. Meaning even risk neutral RECs hedge
to keep the future spot price low, assuming that they are not too small in relative
size to the market. It is legitimate to assume that RECs buy contracts to lower the
future spot price, as their size was significant in the UK, before they were privatized.
Producers coordinate on the future market as before. This model has two parts again.
First, the market equilibrium before the liberalization is solved, second, it is modified
to account for bankruptcy after the liberalization. The first part of the model is
solved for producers that coordinate on the spot market, as only then the number of
forwards and options is guaranteed to be positive. For a study on market power of
UK’s generation duopoly, see Wolfram (1999).40 The equilibrium is shown, when there
40Müsgens (2006) shows that there have been price agreements among German producers in par-
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is no coordination likewise. After the liberalization of the market, producers do not
coordinate, as they did in section 3.2. The liberalization of the electricity market has
come along with strict actions by regulators against price agreements among incumbent
generators. 41 RECs are risk neutral, λ = 0, which reduces the demand for options
and forwards in the same way, a comparison of the two models is thus still possible.
They maximize their expected profit instead of a mean-variance utility function. First,
the forward market has to be solved under the changed market setup to be able to
compare it to the option market, then the option market is solved.
3.3.1 Pre-liberalization period
Forward Market
Production sector
Producers maximize the expected monopoly profit EπM by choosing the expected
monopoly spot quantity EQ, taking the total number of forwards fΣ as given;
max
EQ
EπM = (Ep − c)EQ − fΣ(Ep − pf) + Cov(p,Q) where Ep = A + E − bEQ
and Cov(p,Q) = σ
2
4b . Thus the expected forward price and monopoly quantity are
Ep =
A+ φH + c− bfΣ
2
(3.21)
EQ =
A+ φH − c+ bfΣ
2b
(3.22)
The first order condition of the forward price (3.6), is thus pf = Ep +³
∂fΣ
∂pf
´−1 h
fΣ − (EQ− fΣ)∂Ep∂pf − (Ep− c)
∂EQ
∂pf
i
.
Retail sector
RECs maximize their utility functions of the form (3.7) (with λ = 0) where the foc can
be solved for the number of contracts f (see (3.9)), which can be further transformed
to
f∗(pf) =
V b+A+ φH + c− 2pf
3b
(3.23)
ticular during peak periods.
41The former generation duopoly National Power and Powergen was forced to sell generation units
to reduce their market power. Finally they were bought by foreign competitors after National Power
demerged in 2001.
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This is the number of forwards as a function of pf , which each REC requests. One
can now transform the pf -foc using (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23) to solve for the future spot
price premium,
pf −Ep = 3bfΣ
4
(3.24)
and the optimal number of contracts, which depends on the REC’s market size alone
f∗Σ =
V
2
(3.25)
Option Market
Production sector
The spot price is defined to exceed the strike price, p > ps when  = H, otherwise
a REC would never want to exercise its option. Thus H must be suﬃciently large,
because pf > Ep. Later it is proven that the same holds for options; the expected
unit price, covered by an option is larger than the expected spot price: (1 − φ)pL +
φps + po > Ep. RECs are willing to pay an option price premium, just as they pay
a forward price premium. In return, to receive one unit for the lower strike price,
the REC pays an option price po to the producer in any state of the world. The
total number of options sold to both RECs is oΣ. The generator’s monopoly profit is
πM = (pH − c)QH −φoΣ(pH − ps)+ oΣpo with probability φ where pH = A+H− bQH .
It is πM = (pL − c)QL + oΣpo with probability (1 − φ) and pL = A − bQL, thus the
expected profit function is EπM = (Ep − c)EQ − φoΣ(pH − ps) + oΣpo + Cov(p,Q),
where Ep and Cov(p,Q) are defined in the forward model. The expected price, the
corresponding spot quantity and the high spot price are
Ep =
A+ φH + c− φboΣ
2
(3.26)
EQ =
A+ φH − c+ φboΣ
2b
(3.27)
pH =
A+H + c− boΣ
2
(3.28)
Besides the spot quantity, producers choose po and ps, while RECs choose the
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number of options they want to buy. The first order conditions are
∂EπM
∂po
=
∂Ep
∂po
EQ+ (Ep− c)∂EQ
∂po
+
∂oΣ
∂po
£
po − φ(pH − ps)
¤
+ oΣ
µ
1− φ∂p
H
∂po
¶
.
= 0
(3.29)
∂EπM
∂ps
=
∂Ep
∂ps
EQ+ (Ep− c)∂EQ
∂ps
+
∂oΣ
∂ps
po − φ∂oΣ
∂ps
(pH − ps) + φoΣ
µ
1− φ∂p
H
∂ps
¶
.
= 0
(3.30)
Retail sector
RECs choose the number of options they buy, REC i0s objective (3.7) reduces to
max
oi
Ui = E(πRi ).42 Retailer i0s expected profit is
EπRi = V (r −Ep) + φoi(pH − ps)− oipo (3.31)
The first order condition of (3.31) is
oi =
V ∂Ep∂oi + p
o − φ(pH − ps)
φ∂p
H
∂oi
(3.32)
As the denominator of (3.32) is negative, the REC’s demand for options increases
with pH and decreases with the strike and option price. (3.26)-(3.28) solve for o1(o2) =
1
2
£
V − o2 + b−1
¡
A+H + c− 2ps − 2φ−1po
¢¤
, taking ps and po as given. The demand
for options decreases with the number of options that the other REC buys. The public
good attributes that are observed on the forward market also apply to options. Due
to symmetry across RECs, the optimal number of options based on the underlying
parameter set is
o(ps, po) =
1
3
£
V + b−1
¡
A+H + c− 2ps − 2φ−1po
¢¤
(3.33)
(3.26)-(3.28) and (3.33) transform (3.29) and (3.30) in order to find expressions for
ps and po, keeping in mind that oΣ = 2o(ps, po). The first order condition for the strike
price ps can be expressed as
42If we would allow λ > 0, the variance of the REC’s profit is (φ − φ2)[V H − o(pH − ps)]2. The
high demand price is a function of o. The derivative of V ar(πR) with respect to o depends on cubed
and quadratic oi,- and oj ,- terms, which would not allow us to have closed form solutions.
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ps(po, oΣ) =
1
4
£
2(A+H + c− 2φ−1po) + oΣ(2bφ− b)
¤
(3.34)
It is linearly dependent to the first order condition for the option price po
po(ps, oΣ) =
φ
4
[2(A+H + c− 2ps) + oΣ(2bφ− b)] (3.35)
This is not surprising as (pH − ps) is a transfer from the producer to the REC with
probability φ, and po is a transfer from the REC to the producer with certainty, while
both pairs of players are risk neutral and maximize their expected profit, ps must be
negatively correlated to po, and one variable can be expressed through the other. One
can write po(o, ps) as po(ps) using o(ps, po) and substitute po(ps) in o(ps, po) to receive
the optimal number of options o∗, independent of po and ps, based on the underlying
parameter set. po(ps) can be transformed to
po + φps =
φ
2
(A+H + c) +
φb(2φ− 1)
2(φ+ 1)
V (3.36)
which is the expected option payment made to the generator, to avoid paying pH .
Adding (1− φ)pL to po + φps, gives an expected unit price; when that unit is covered
with an option. (1−φ)pL+ po+φps−Ep = (4φ+1)bφV
6(1+φ) > 0 does not depend on the size
of the demand shock. This corresponds to the observation, first made by Powell (1993)
for the forward market, who shows that pf > Ep, which goes back to Allaz and Vila’s
(1993) article. But so far, it has not been shown for the option market. The reason
behind this solution is the same; forwards and options lower the expected future spot
price. Substituting po in (3.33) by (3.36) gives an expression for the optimal number
of options
o∗Σ =
2
3
V
2− φ
1 + φ
(3.37)
There are all the ingredients, one needs to compare the expected spot price for
futures and options, stated here again for convenience: EpFutures = A+φH+c−bfΣ
2
with
f∗Σ =
V
2
and EpOptions = A+φH+c−φboΣ
2
. The expected spot price is larger in the presence
of options than forwards when: φo∗Σ < f
∗
Σ ⇔
2φ(2−φ)
3(1+φ) < 1, which holds for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
The expected spot price is smaller in the forward model. For the simulation of both
models, the same parameters are used as before: h = 0.15, V = 2.5, A = 50, b = 0.67
and c = 20 . The retail price did not matter in the analysis of the first part of this
article, here it equals r=£60/MWh as in Green (2004). Furthermore the probability of
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f ∗Σ , o
∗
Σ Ep p
f ,Epw. Options EQ EπM EπR E (CS )
Forwards 1.25 39.48 40.21 30.63 609.90 50.65 159.51
Options 1.6 39.72 40.00 30.42 609.73 50.23 156.31
Table 3.1: Welfare in the absence of bankruptcy
a positive demand shock, H = 20, is φ = 50%. Before the liberalization takes place,
market participants choose the values given by table 3.1.
Welfare is hardly smaller in the one-way contract model, residual consumers loose
about 2% in expectation [E(CS)], while expected producer and REC profits are barely
diﬀerent. Note that the expected price of a unit purchased with an option is less
expensive than pf , which holds when 8φ2− 5φ−1 < 0. One can repeat the derivations
described in this section so far, when producers do not coordinate at the spot market.
In that case, the analog equation for (3.36) and (3.37) are
po + φps =
φ
18 + 12φ
[A (9 + 4φ) + c (9 + 8φ) +H (6 + 7φ) + V b (−3 + 4φ)] (3.38)
and
o∗Σ
2
=
3V b+ c−A− φH
b(6 + 4φ)
(3.39)
One can easily see that there are long hedges possible, when producers do not coop-
erate at the spot market and 3V b+c < A+φH. The rest of the analysis uses the model,
where producers cooperate, and shows under what circumstances a welfare maximizing
regulator prefers one-way contracts over two-way contracts, when the default threat is
included. In the absence of bankruptcy, one-way contracts have the disadvantage that
just in the high demand state, a fix price is paid for the production that was covered.
When options are “out-of-the-money” and producers play the Cournot game. Thus
intuitively it is clear, why one-way contracts can not reduce market power to the same
extend as two-way contracts do.
3.3.2 Post liberalization period
This section contains the same structure previously used. After a competitive fringe
has entered the market, the new demand for incumbent retailers is (3.14) as before,
and the optimal retail price is (3.16).
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Forwards
The retailer’s profit in the absence and presence of a demand shock are
πR = V
2
4h + f
∗(pL − pf) if  = 0
πR = V
2
4h + f
∗(pH − pf) if  = H
(3.40)
πR > 0, when  = H in the forward model, because pf > Ep > pL. Bankruptcy is
possible, when  = 0 in the forward model when switching costs are low (large value of
h), V is small and pL is much smaller than pf , such that πR becomes negative. When
 = H, and thus bankruptcy does not occur with certainty, (3.3) and (3.4) continue to
hold, where A is substituted by the realized intercept A+H. Bankruptcy does not play
any role. When  = 0, then a retailer’s profit is πRi =
V 2
4h + f
∗
i (pL− pf), where f∗i =
f∗Σ
2
.
Each producer maximizes its profit, max
qLi
πPi = (pL− c)qLi −f∗i (pL−pf)(1+sπRi ), where
(1 + sπRi ) is the survival probability of retailer i, when πRi < 0. (3.19) and (3.20)
describe the equilibrium, where the realized intercept is A∗ = A.
Options
The possible retail profits in the option model are
πR = V
2
4h − o∗po if  = 0
πR = V
2
4h + o
∗[pH − (ps + po)] if  = H
(3.41)
When  = 0 the producer’s objective ismax
qL
πP = (pL−c)qL+opo and the equilibrium
values are qL∗ = A−c
3b and p
L∗ = A+2c
3
. Thus producers oﬀer the regular Cournot price.
It is a reasonable assumption that the option price has been paid in advance, thus
a possible bankruptcy does not aﬀect the producer’s objective. When  = H, the
producer’s objective is
max
qHi
πPi = (p
H − c)qHi + oi[po + ps − pH ] (3.42)
If  = H , options are “in the money” and the second term of πP is strictly positive
by definition, as po + ps > pH . Otherwise the option would never be exercised. In the
preceding analysis, the relevant value has been, po + φps. The problem was defined in
such a way that options are exercised when  = H. It would not have been a realistic
assumption from the REC’s point of view, when it would make a loss through exercising
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Figure 3.3: Welfare: Forwards vs. Options
an option, when the demand is high. Options just lower producer’s market power on
the spot market if they are exercised for  = H. If it would not be in the REC’s interest
to exercise the option, it would be known to the producers. Thus options would not
reduce market power and RECs would not purchase them in the first place.
The optimal values are qH∗ = A+H−c+bo
∗
3b and p
H∗ = A+H+2c−2bo
∗
3
, where o∗ = oΣ
2
.
They have the same structure as in the Allaz Vila equilibrium. The buyer of one-way
contracts pays in either state of the world po. Thus the diﬀerence between profit and
loss is smaller with options than with forwards.
3.3.3 Results
There are two diﬀerent equilibria for forwards and options, respectively when  = 0
and  = H. It has already been proven that forwards are preferable to options in
the absence of bankruptcy. After weighting the two possible outcomes of the forward
model equilibrium, one can determine, if either options or forwards are preferable in
the presence of the threat of bankruptcy.
The same parameters are used to generate figure 3.3, which summarizes the main
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result: in the absence of a default threat (s = α = 0), the option model yields a
lower welfare than the forward model, which has been shown algebraically before. But
note that the welfare diﬀerence is quite small. The lower diagram shows the relation
between s and α, the upper diagram between α and welfare.43 As the bankruptcy
threat of former RECs just concerns producers in the forward model, welfare in the
option model is not aﬀected by the exogenous parameter s. The higher the bankruptcy
probability α = −sπR becomes, the lower the welfare in the two-way contract model
just as in figure 3.1 and 3.2. For a default probability of around 10%, a regulator that
maximizes total welfare would prefer the option model over that of the forward model.
One has to bear in mind that this estimate is very conservative, as in this model,
default only has an eﬀect on the spot, but not contract market.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a simple model, where downstream firms, operating in a com-
petitive environment, may go bankrupt after incurring a loss on forward contracts that
have been signed with upstream firms. The first part of the model shows that for-
mer RECs, which still hold long term forward contracts, benefit when they have an
owner that is less likely to bail them out. The bankruptcy probability consists of the
retailer’s loss, and an exogenous multiplier that reflects the willingness for bail-out of
the retailer’s owner. Producers minimize the risk of a retailer not meeting its contract
of diﬀerence payments by reducing the production quantity and hence increasing the
spot price, which in return reduces the diﬀerence. For reasonable parameters, when an
owner is less likely to bail its subsidiary out, the upward spot price shift is suﬃciently
large to turn a loss (in the absence of a default threat) into a profit (in the presence
of a default threat). Depending on the extent of the upward price adoption, producers
benefit or loose. Consumers always loose more than firms gain, thus welfare decreases.
The second part of the model introduces one-way contracts, and demonstrates that
options lower the spot price, as forwards do. In the absence of risk aversion, the
expected price of a unit that is bought with an option, exceeds the expected price. Once
again, the parallel can be drawn to the forward market. Options reduce the profit of an
upstream firm less than forwards do; thus the spot price is larger in an option model
than a forward model. The model simulates the English/ Welsh electricity market and
shows that the welfare diﬀerence is very small. Producer and retailer profits are hardly
43Welfare equals the residual consumer surplus, which is the area below the inverse demand function
and above the spot price. In addition, the producer and retail profits are added.
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diﬀerently aﬀected by the instruments, and consumer surplus decreases by a mere 2%.
Including bankruptcy and comparing the option and forward model again, one-way
contracts are preferred to two-way contracts for bankruptcy probabilities of 10%. If
one includes other costs that are connected to bankruptcy, and considering that this
estimate is very conservative, options might quickly become preferred to forwards.
When regulators decide how to treat oﬀ-market trade in the near future, they shall
have to keep in mind that depending on the industry structure, insolvency might not
only cost taxpayers’ money, it may also reduce the market power mitigating eﬀect
of two-way contracts. If two-way contracts become more heavily regulated to avoid
bankruptcies, and require a large amount of capital as market participants claim, one-
way contracts could step in, and play the same role that forwards have done in the
past.
Bibliography
Allaz, Blaise and Vila, Jean-Luc (1993), "Cournot competition, forward mar-
kets and eﬃciency", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 59, 1-16
Apps, Patricia and Rees, Ray (2004), "Fertility, Taxation and Family Policy",
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, 745-763
Apps, Patricia and Rees, Ray (2009), "Public Economics and the Household",
Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press
Becker, Gary (1993), "A Treatise on the Family", Enlarged edition. Cambridge
USA, Harvard University Press
Bedard, Kelly and Deschenes, Olivier (2003), "Sex Preferences, Marital Disso-
lution and the Economic Status of Women", University of California at Santa Barbara,
Economics Working Paper Series 6-03
Blackburn, McKinley; Bloom, David and Neumark, David (1993), "Fertility
Timing, Wages, and Human Capital", Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 6, 1-30
Browning, Martin (1992), "Children and Household Economic Behavior", Journal
of Economic Literature, Vol. 30, 1434-75
Brueckner, Jan and Raymon, Neil (1983), "Optimal Production with Learning
by Doing", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Vol. 8, 127-135
BTM Consult ApS (2008), "Press Release of March 27th, 2008", Internet address:
http://www.btm.dk/Documents/Pressrelease.pdf, accessed on 14.04.2008
Bibliography 103
Bushnell, James (2007), "Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets",
Journal of Regulation Economics, Vol. 32, 225-245
Chao, Hung-po and Wilson, Robert (2004), "Resource Adequacy and Market
Power Mitigation via Option Contracts", University of California Energy Institute
Power Conference
Cigno, Alessandro (1991), "Economics of the Family", Oxford UK, Oxford Uni-
versity Press
De la Croix, David and Doepke, Matthias (2003), "Inequality and Growth:
Why Diﬀerential Fertility Matters", American Economic Review, Vol. 93, 1091-1113
Dena (2005), "Energiewirtschaftliche Planung für die Netzintegration von Winden-
ergie in Deutschland an Land und Oﬀshore bis zum Jahr 2020", Internet address:
http://www.oﬀshore-wind.de, accessed on 23.03.2008
Dixit, Avinash (1980), "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence", Economic
Journal, Vol. 90, 95-106
European Commission (2006), "Eurostat Population Statistics", Luxembourg
European Commission, Eurostat (2008), "Population and social conditions",
Statistics in focus 81/2008
Financial Times Deutschland (7.10.2009), "Industrie drohen Milliardenverluste
wegen Derivatereform", by Milne, Richard; Grant, Jeremy and Bayer, Tobias; Internet
address: http://www.ftd.de, accessed on 07.10.2009
Green, Richard (1999), "Transmission pricing in England and Wales", Utilities
Policy, Vol. 6, 185-193
Green, Richard (2004), "Retail Competition and Electricity Contracts", Cambridge
Working Papers in Economics 0406, University of Cambridge
Grimm, Veronika and Zoettl, Gregor (2006), "Access to commitment devices
reduces investment incentives in oligopoly", No 25 Working Paper Series in Economics,
University of Cologne
Bibliography 104
Grinold, Richard (1996), "Domestic grapes from imported wine", Journal of Port-
folio Management, Vol. 26, 29-40
Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana, Amyra (1984), "A Theory of Allocation
of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage", Economic Journal, Vol. 94, 863-82
Gustafsson, Siv (2001), "Optimal age at motherhood. Theoretical and empiri-
cal considerations on postponement of maternity in Europe", Journal of Population
Economics, Vol. 14, 225-47
Happel, Stephen; Hill, J. and Low, S. (1984), "An Economic Analysis of the
Timing of Childbirth", Population Studies, Vol. 38, 299—311
Heckman, James and Walker, James (1990), "The Relationship between Wages
and Income and the Timing and Spacing of Births: Evidence from Swedish Longitudi-
nal Data", Econometrica, Vol. 58, 1411-41
Hillman, Arye and Long, Ngo Van (1983), "Pricing and Depletion of an Ex-
haustible Resource When There Is Anticipation of Trade Disruption", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, 215-33
Hotz, Joseph and Miller, Robert (1986), "The Economics of Family Planning",
unpublished manuscript
Irwin, Douglas and Klenow, Peter (1994), "Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in
the Semiconductor Industry," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.102, 1200-27
Iset (2005), "Eﬃzienz der Windenergie, Auszug aus: Windenergie Report Deutsch-
land 2005", Internet address: http://www.wind-energie.de, accessed on 10.12.2009
Kreps, David and Scheinkman, Jose (1983), "Quantity precommitment and
Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14,
326-337
Kreyenfeld, Michaela (2003), "Crisis or adaptation reconsidered: A comparison
of East and West German fertility patterns in the first six years after the Wende",
European Journal of Population, Vol. 19, 303-29
Bibliography 105
Le Coq, Chloe (2004), "Long-term supply contracts and collusion in the electricity
market", SSE/ EFI Working Paper Series No 552
Liski, Matti and Montero, Juan-Pablo (2006), "Forward trading and collusion
in oligopoly", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 131, 212-230
Mahenc, Philippe and Salanie Francois (2004), "Softening competition
through forward trading", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 116, 282-293
Monopolies and Merger Commission (1996), "National Power plc and Southern
Electric plc: A report on the proposed merger", London: HMSO
Murphy, Frederic and Smeers, Yves (2005), "Forward markets may not de-
crease market power when capacities are endogenous, CORE Discussion Paper No
2005/28
Muesgens, Felix (2006), "Quantifying Market Power in the German Wholesale
Electricity Market using a Dynamic Multi-regional Dispatch Model", Journal of In-
dustrial Economics, Vol. 54, 471-498
Newbery, David (1995), "Power markets and market power", Energy Journal, Vol.
16, 41-66
Newbery, David (1998), "Competition, contracts, and entry in the electricity spot
market", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, 726-749
Newbery, David (2008), "Forward contracting and merger analysis in the electricity
industry", EPRG Working Paper
Newman, John (1988), "A Stochastic Dynamic Model of Fertility", Research in
Population Economics, Vol. 6, 41-68
Parente, Stephen (1994), "Technology Adoption, Learning-by Doing and Economic
Growth", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 63, 346-369
Powell, Andrew (1993), "Trading forward in an imperfect market: the case if
electricity in Britain", Economic Journal, Vol. 103, 444-453
Bibliography 106
Protopapadakis, Aris and Stoll, Hans (1983), "Spot and Futures Prices and
the Law of One Price", Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, 1431-1455
Rees, Ray (1986), "Indivisibilities, Pricing and Investment: The Case of the Second
Best", Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, 195-210
Schmidt, Klaus (1997), “Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition,”
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 64, 191-214.
Scholz, Sebastian (2009), "Contracts in the Presence of Bankruptcy", unpublished
manuscript.
Soares, Rodrigo (2005), "Mortality Reductions, Educational Attainment, and Fer-
tility Choice", American Economic Review, Vol. 95, 580-601
Spence, Michael (1977), "Entry, investment and oligopolistic pricing" Bell Journal
of Economics, Vol. 8, 534-44
Spence, Michael (1981), "The Learning Curve and Competition", Bell Journal of
Economics, Vol. 12, 49-70
Takayama, Akira (1974), "Mathematical Economics", Hinsdale Illinois, The Dry-
den Press
Jamasb, Tooraj (2007), "Technical Change Theory and Learning Curves: Patterns
of Progress in Energy Technologies", Energy Journal, Vol. 28, 51-71
Vazquez, Carlos; Rivier, Michel and Perez-Arriaga, Ignacio (2002), "A
market approach to long-term security of supply", IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, Vol. 17, 349-357
Walker, James (1995), "The Eﬀect of Public Policies on Recent Swedish Fertility
Behavior", Journal of Population Economics Vol. 8, 223-51
Ward, Michael and Butz, William (1980), "Completed Fertility and Its Tim-
ing", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, 917-40
Bibliography 107
Willems, Bert (2004), "Cournot Competition, Financial Option markets and Eﬃ-
ciency", CES Discussion Paper Series 04.14
Wissenschaftliches Institut fuer Infrastruktur und Kommunikations-
dienste, WIK (2008), "Eﬃzienz und Stabilität des Stromgroßhandelsmarktes in
Deutschland- Analyse und wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen", WIK, No 317
Wolfram, Catherine (1999), "Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity
spot market", American Economic Review, Vol. 89, 805-825
Wright, Theodore (1936), "Factors Aﬀecting the Cost of Airplanes", Journal of
Aeronautical Sciences, Vol. 3, 122-8
Young, Alwyn (1993), "Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing", The Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 101, 443-472
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und
ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt
übernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen sind als solche kenntlich
gemacht.
Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht
veröﬀentlicht.
Datum: 18.12.2009
Unterschrift:
Curriculum Vitae
10/2006-current Ph.D. program in Economics
Munich Graduate School of Economics
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany
02/2008 - 05/2008
Electricity Policy Research Group
University of Cambridge
Supervisor David Newbery
09/2005 - 06/2006 Studies in Economics, Master of Economics
University of Hong Kong
10/2002 - 05/2005 Studies in Economics, Bachelor of Economics
University of Magdeburg, Germany
1992-2001 Norbert Gymnasium Knechsteden
Dormagen, Germany
10/03/1982 born in Düsseldorf, Germany
